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In Hungary the first intergovernmental grants were introduced after 
the political changes and the foundation of new local 
municipalities in 1991. The role of local governments were 
redefined, and also the system of state transfers were completely 
changed. A more western type grant system was introduced. However 
the system is not comprehensive, does not have an underlying theory 
behind it and has several defects in the practice. 
In Hungary it would be inevitable to design a more comprehensive 
grant structure and first of all to evaluate the effects of the 
existing system. This evaluation should be started as soon as 
possible for  the sake of both the cities and the government 
officials to see whether the present structure of grants can 
address the problem of the cities and fulfill the expected 
objectives. The evaluation should be continuous, because the grant 
system will change following the economic transformation too. 
My research and my studies at the Johns Hopkiris University, 
Institute fo r  Policy Studies in 1993-1994 aimed at gaining 
experience and knowledge on government finance issues in the US 
which served as a basis of this study. Both my experience and the 
research paper will contribute to the evaluation of the above 
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mentioned problems and to the design of better public finance 
policies through my consultation work to municipalities in my 
country . 
This paper will help policy makers in Hungary understand a method 
to measure the financial capacity of local governments, the 
theoretical underpinning for intergovernmental grants, the design 
of a grant and its effectiveness to address a certain problem or 
achieve a certain objective, and alternative tools; which address 
fiscal disparities among different jurisdictions. 
These issues are quite relevant in Hungary at the moment, because 
the new government which will start its work probably in July 1994, 
will definitely change the system of government transfers. 
The present system lacks a comprehensive theory underlying the 
distribution of roles and responsibilities between the national and 
the local levels of government. On the basis of the theories of 
fiscal federalism2 the allocation of tasks should be rethought . 
1 
In the lack of considerable own sources - like local taxes - of 
municipalities, the national government transfers finance a big 
The liberals and the Socialists which won the elections, ruled local 
municipalities, and saw the disadvantages of the system from the local point of 
view. The liberal and socialist mayors and local politicians seriously criticized 
the previous government by saying that it mandated tasks to the local level 
without assuring the sources to complete the responsibilities. 
The theory of fiscal federalism helps understan.d the cases for 
decentralization of public services. 
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part of the operating and the capital budget. However the transfers 
do not take into consideration the revenue raising abilities of 
different municipalities, which can lead to serious problems in the 
future in poor localities where the basic public provision will not 
be assured. As a consequence big disparities will be created among 
different jurisdictions in the country. The central government has 
to measure the revenue raising capacity of local governments 
urgently and transfers should be redesigned to introduce more 
redistribution to the system. Local governments will have to 
consider alternative policy tools like the tax base sharing, user 
charges or special districts to address the fiscal capacity 
problems of a city or of adjacent neighborhoods. 
Towards the analysis for the problems of Hungary I used the 
practical and theoretical experience I gained by studying the case 
of Baltimore city. A number of policy tools that address the fiscal 
capacity problems of the city on the basis of the theories and 
principles of fiscal federalism are examined in my paper. The focus 
of the study is an intergovernmental grant for community and 
economic development from the federal government to Baltimore. The 
ultimate objective of the study is to examine the extent to which 
intergovernmental grants for community and economic development can 
address the deep fiscal distress of the city. 
The mis-match of revenues and expenditures of many urban local 





















professional research of fiscal federalism and public policy in the 
middle of the 60's. The terminology of fiscal mis-match expresses 
that the own revenues of the local governments can not cover the 
expenditures for their necessary public services, or the same level 
of public service provision can only be achieved by imposing 
heavier burden on the population in some jurisdictions than in 
others. 
The deepening fiscal problems of old central city governments from 
the 60s showed that fiscal disparities are related to broader 
economic and urban development issues. The relative fiscal 
disparities of cities and suburbs, associated with the segregation 
of poor minority groups in the central cities, the increasing rate 
of unemployment and crime caught the attention of public policy 
makers 30 years ago. 
The analysis of the cause for the disparities is not the subject of 
my study. In my paper I focus on how local governments can respond 
to these disparities, and whether the tools the federal, the state 
and the local governments use, address the fiscal capacity 
problems . 
In the first chapter of the study I describe one method to measure 
the revenue raising ability and expenditure needs of cities. The 
method I explain, was worked out by the Advisory Commission for 
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Intergovernmental Relations3 , a government agency in the US. 
In the second chapter I apply this method to Baltimore. I evaluate 
the city's financial capacity and its tax effort, and the most 
significant problems the city has concerning its budget. 
In the third chapter I concentrate on intergovernmental grants as 
a policy tool to address fiscal capacity problems of local 
governments. I describe the system, the history and the underlying 
theory of the grants in the US in more detail. I also present the 
Community Development Block Grant and the use of the grant in 
Baltimore City. 
In the fourth chapter I describe a number of alternative policy 
tools a local government can introduce to collect more revenues 
besides taxes. I evaluate three other policy too.ls which local 
municipalities can use to raise more revenues: realigning the tasks 
among the different tiers of government, tax base sharing, and user 
charges. I give a brief theoretical analysis of these tools and a 
few examples on how the tool in question is used in Baltimore. 
The US Advisory Commission for Intergovernmental Relations was created in 
1959 by the Congress. ACIR is an independent commission which gives 
recommendations and conducts research on the cooperation among the different 
tiers of the government in the US. 
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2, Assessment of the financial capacity of local governments 
One method of measuring fiscal capacity is described in this 
chapter. This approach - which measures a local government's 
capability to cover the expenditures of necessary public services 
from its own sources - was used by the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations' . 
The fiscal mis-match of local governments can be defined as the 
difference between their revenue raising ability and the level of 
expenditures necessary for the jurisdiction to pxovide adequate 
public services. 
The relative disparity among different jurisdictions, among central 
cities and their suburbs, or among states can be defined as the 
difference in fiscal capacities of the municipalities or states in 
question. The cause of relative fiscal disparities can be the low 
revenue sources of local governments, the high level of necessary 
provision of public services and the inadequate tax effort of the 
jurisdiction. 
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations worked out and 
published the first analysis of tax capacity measuring in 1967. The analysis was 
based on the Representative Tax System methodology. The method was taken over by 
Maryland too. 
In 1989 ACIR completed the representative approach by developing the 
Representative Expenditure System. 
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After describing the method which measures fiscal capacity - the 
Representative Tax System and the Representative Expenditure 
System - I analyze Baltimore's fiscal capacity and evaluate the 
causes of its fiscal problems, 
2.7 A s s e s s i n g  r e v e n u e  r a i s i n g  a b i l i t y  (The R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Tax 
System RTS) 
F o r  being able to evaluate the causes for serious fiscal 
disparities, first we have to look at the revenue raising ability 
of local governments. 
In the US more methods are being used for analyzing revenue raising 
ability, More attempts have been made to work out normative revenue 
raising ability methods, on the basis of which revenue raising 
abilities of different jurisdictions can be compared independently 
from the existing revenue system of the particular local 
government. 
For many decades the main basis for  assessing revenue raising 
ability of a jurisdiction or a state was per capita :income. A local 
governmentls potential was then counted with the use of ideal or 
model tax systems in each state. However this approach was changed 











a tool to evaluate the fiscal capacity of different 
jurisdictions. 5 
The Representative Tax System on the level of a designated area is 
based on the actual tax policies in use on that territory. The 
parameters of each type of tax in the representative tax system is 
chosen to be the prototype of all the systems in use, Therefore, 
the tax base of a tax in the representative tax system is the 
"prototype" of all the tax bases used for that particular tax. The 
choice of the tax base is made after an evaluation and comparison 
of the tax bases used all over the area, and those components are 
included in the representative tax base which most of the levying 
governments use. E.g. if the property tax in most of the levying 
governments include residential property, then the Representative 
Base will include residential property too, Or, if most of the 
levying jurisdictions exclude the services from the sales tax, the 
prototype tax base does not include it either. A typical base may 
or may not be different from the statutory tax base used in the 
imposing governments in practice. 
When the tax base is worked out and the total collections from a 
tax is known at the level of the designated area, the rate is 
computed by dividing the total revenues with the representative 
base. 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations: Measures of State and 















With the help of the representative base and rate, the tax capacity 
can be calculated for the area. The RTS rate applied to the RTS 
base gives the area average. The area tax revenue divided by the 
total population of the area gives the fiscal capacity index. 
The Representative Tax System does not take into consideration the 
parameters of the tax system an imposing jurisdiction uses in 
reality. It tells the levying government how much it could yield if 
it used the RTS. 
The difference between the revenues collected under the real tax 
system and the revenue the RTS could yield gives a picture of the 
government's tax effort. By using this method, and looking at the 
components of the representative tax base and the level of the 
representative tax rate the imposing governments can evaluate the 
causes for the possible inadequate revenue sources. This can be the 
low level of tax effort (e.g. if the tax base does not include many 
components of the representative base), but also the low value of 
the tax base, like e.g the low level of taxable income or the low 
level of taxable assessed property value. 
In the US the Representative Tax System is applied to compare 
states with each other and with the national average, in which case 
we get a picture of the fiscal disparities among states. 
For calculating fiscal disparities among states the total revenue 
1 3  
yield from the RTS in a state is calculated using the theoretical 
value of the national Representative Tax Base and the national Tax 
Rates. This revenue is divided by the total population of the 
state, and the index is compared to the national average, and to 
other state indices, which gives a picture of the state's relative 
fiscal capacity. 
The most recent RTS uses 27 tax categories in the US. The base and 
the rate of these taxes are the "representatives" or typical 
parameters chosen and computed by comparing the systems of the 50 
states. The Representative Tax Systems include all the taxes which 
- on the basis of the judgment of those prepared them - are used 
in many of the states. 6 
In the US the Representative Tax System is used by some states as 
well, to compare the fiscal capacities of local governments located 
on the territory of the state with each other and with the state 
average. Based on the same method, the process of the computation 
is the following. The Representative Tax Base is worked out by 
looking at the tax bases used by the imposing governments in the 
state. The total yield of the tax at the state level is then 
divided by the Representative Tax Base, which gives the 
Representative Tax Rate. The Representative Tax rate applied to the 
Representative Tax Base gives the Representative Tax yield at the 
The Census uses 29 tax categories at the moment to show all types of tax 
revenues in the US, but two of the included taxes are not considered to be 
significant, therefore they were excluded from the Representative Tax Base. 
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state level. This number divided by the total &ate population 
which gives the state index, 
Local governments in the state apply the theocratically available 
level of the Representative Tax Base and Representative Tax Rate, 
worked out at the sate level, for their jurisdiction and divide it 
by the number of the inhabitants. This index can be compared with 
the state average index and the indices of other local governments 
to show local disparities among local municipalities. 
In Maryland e.g. the tax capacity indexes are calculated for the 
counties and Baltimore city on the state level. For measuring local 
revenue capacity, the State Department of Fiscal Services uses 
eight taxes7 which are levied in most of the juri.sdictions. The 
Representative Tax Bases in Maryland are shown in Appendix B. The 
calculation prepared in the state of Maryland helps us evaluate 
Baltimore's fiscal capacity in comparison wit.h its needed 
expenditures and the fiscal capacities of other Maryland 
jurisdictions in part 3 . 2 .  
These are: the property tax, the local income tax, the property transfer 
tax, the recordation tax, the local sales tax on utilities, the hotel tax, the 
admissions and amusement tax, the water, waste water and sewer fees. Local taxes 
constitute 68% of local own revenues, the remaining 32% include service charges, 
like the water and sewer fee. 
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2.2 The Representative Expenditure System (RES) 
Similarly to the Representative Tax system, to measure the public 
service "needs" of a government I a normative system was 
developed . 
The Representative Expenditure System on a designated area takes 
into consideration all the public service functions governments at 
all level of the area provide. For each function a workload measure 
is determined, which is worked out with the help of the literature 
and consultations with government officials. The workload measure 
is chosen so that it relates the costs of a function to an index 
(cost/workload unit) which is easy to get access to in each 
government. E.g if on an area governments provide secondary 
education, then for this function a workload measure is determined. 
The best index to asses the necessary costs of schools in a 
jurisdiction can be the number of children between the age of 1 4  
and 18. Another parameter of the workload measure -- with the same 
or different weight - can take into consideration the level of 
poverty too, because it increases the costs of education. To get 
the representative expenditure for a category, the total outlays 
for that particular function at the level of the designated area is 
divided by the total value of the workload measure of the area. 
The representative expenditures method was first elaborated by Robert W. 
Rafuse, Jr. in 'I Federal-State-Local Fiscal Relations: Technical Papers." 
Washington D.C., Department of the Treasury, Office of State and Local Finance, 
1986. 
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This average cost per workload unit is similar to the average tax 
rate in the RTS. If we multiply the area wide value of the workload 
unit with the area average cost per workload unit with each 
function, we get the Representative Expenditures a.t the level of 
the designated area. E,g. in the case of education the total 
education outlays of all governments on the area is divided by the 
value of the workload measure which - in our example - is the 
weighted average of children between the age of 1 4  and 18 and the 
number of people living in poverty. That gives the cost/workload 
unit for education. If the average cost is multiplied with the 
number of workload measure units of a subordinate government on the 
designated area, the Representative Expenditures of that function 
in that subordinate government is calculated. The Representative 
Expenditures for all the functions are added and this number is 
divided by the total population of the jurisdiction which is the 
Representative Expenditure Index. 
The Representative expenditure system works with basic assumptions. 
These are as follows: 
- the prices of inputs to provide services are the same in all 
jurisdictions, 9 
- the effectiveness of the authorities is similar all over the 
country, which means that the differences in cost levels of public 
services are not due to the different level of effectiveness, 
This is a very restrictive condition, because inputs cost different 





















- there are no economies of scale, which means tha.t price of the 
provision of the public goods does not decrease with the increase 
in the number of goods supplied. 
In the US the national level of the Representative Expenditures is 
calculated with the above mentioned method and divided by the 
number of the population. This index is compared with state 
indexes. State level Representative Expenditures a.re computed by 
multiplying the national average of cost/workload unit with the 
workload values in each state respectively. The RE divided by the 
number of the state population gives the state index. State indexes 
can be compared to the national index an with otheir state indexes 
to show the relative differences in expenditure needs among the 
states . 
In the US Representative Expenditures of local governments are 
calculated and compared at the state level in some states. 
The method of calculation is the same as described above with the 
difference that the average cost/workload unit is computed by 
dividing the total outlays on the state level with the value of the 
workload measure in the state. Local governments then use the state 
average cost/workload unit and multiply it with the value of the 
workload measure relevant to their jurisdictions . The 
Representative Expenditures received this way for each function is 
added and divided by the population. The RE index can be compared 
with the state index and with other local governments' indexes to 
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be able to compare fiscal capacities. 
The representative expenditure of a local government shows how much 
it would cost for the jurisdiction to provide a certain service at 
state-wide average level. 
The representative expenditure system on the state level can be 
best used to compare it to the expenditure levels of other 
jurisdictions to see whether the municipality has to spend more of 
its revenues to provide the same level of public services and can 
also be compared to the representative tax capacity to see how much 
percentage the local government can cover from its own tax sources. 
Comparisons among local governments in different s t a t e s  may lead to 
wrong conclusions because the mandatory functions and input costs 
of local jurisdictions differ from state to state. Within a state 
however the mandatory tasks of jurisdictions involved in the 
assessment are similar, therefore the Representative Expenditures 
of local governments are comparable. 
The state of Maryland at present uses 22  functions to estimate 
representative expenditures in the state. Each function has one or 
more workload measures with different weight. The description of 
the workload measures can be found in Appendix E, while the 
computation of the cost/workload measure unit is presented in 
Appendix D. The RE-s computed for the counties of the sate of 





















Representative Expenditures of Baltimore city, in part 3 . 3 .  
2.3 The  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  of the R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Tax  Revenue  and the 
Representative Expenditure System in Hungary 
In Hungary it would be inevitable to set up a system of 
Representative Revenues and Expenditures on the national level to 
evaluate whether local governments can cover the costs of the 
designated operation tasks from their revenues, and also to assess 
the disparities among local governments. 
The Representative Revenue System should not only include taxes and 
user charges but also government transfers. The reason for that is 
that a big share of the operating budget of local municipalities is 
covered from government transfers. In the first step of the 
evaluation we could compare the Representative Tax Capacities of 
jurisdictions, completing the analysis with those revenues which 
local governments receive from the privatization of the state owned 
companies and assets, which does not exist as a revenue source in 
the US. In the second step - as in the case of Mary:land in chapter 
3.2 - the government transfers should be taken into account, and an 
assessment should be made whether grants eliminate or at least 
partly compensate for the fiscal disparities. 
The number and types of taxes to be included in the computation in 
the US is based on looking at the practice of all local and state 
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governments and those taxes are chosen which most of the 
jurisdictions levy. However the choice among taxes in Hungary 
should not be based on whether most of the jurisdictions impose the 
tax or not, because this way we will not get a complex picture of 
the possibilities of local governments. Most municipalities in 
Hungary do not levy any local taxes or only a limited number of 
them, in spite of the fact that they could be introduced although 
only with certain legal restrictions. l o  However a number of local 
taxes should 
Representative. 
size”, on the 
be chosen 
Revenues of 
basis of a 
yield some revenues but 
political concerns. For 
and included in the calculation of 
local governments of relatively similar 
concern that those taxes could easily 
they are not introduced because of 
different size categories of local 
governments, different revenue categories should be chosen. 
Income taxes and sales taxes should not be included in the analysis 
because they are levied uniformly in the whole country. The value 
added tax on small entrepreneurs, the property tax and licenses e.g 
are imposed with local discretion. It would be very important to 
include other revenues in the analysis too, such as the income from 
leasing, renting or sales of state owned property. These sources 
are especially important in some downtown districts of Budapest, 
l o  The Law on Local taxes restricts the regulations local governments can 
introduce concerning local taxes. In the case of the property tax e.g. the number 
and the level of exemptions is determined centrally which discourages localities 
to levy this type of tax. 
’’ Smaller local governments - like villages - may not be able to impose 





















which lead to extreme disparities among the different neighborhoods 
of the capital. 
Also,  the design of the Representative Tax Base should consider the 
legal possibilities of local governments. In the practice 
jurisdictions may not introduce tax bases which would allow them to 
gain a considerable yield, although they could., Here too, a 
difference has to be made between smaller local governments, like 
villages, and cities. The later ones have much bigger possibilities 
to extend their tax bases, therefore when designing the parameters 
of the Representative Tax Base for a village one has to consider, 
that the theoretical Tax Base for a small locality is limited. 
The proposed changes in designing the taxes and the elements of the 
Representative Tax Bases included in the Representative Tax 
Capacity Analysis in Hungary would make the system more abstract. 
A t  the same time the total revenues from taxes which are n o t  levied 
in the practice will have to be estimated, which will make the 
evaluation harder than the US system. However I be1:ieve that these 
modifications are necessary, because the latent disparities are 
much bigger than we could show on the basis of the existing 
budgets. 
The Representative Expenditures can be compared at national level 
in Hungary. The functions undertaken by local muni.cipalities are 
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12 very similar and comparable. 
The workload measures should be as simple as possi:ble and defined 
considering the data available in the Census or other sources which 
are issued periodically. The total outlays of the functions can use 
the budget data of local governments collected by the Regional 
Headquarters of the Ministry of the Interior. 
The necessary statistical sources are available to introduce the 
Representative Expenditure and Revenue System in Hungary. with the 
above mentioned changes in the definition of the categories 
included in the assessment, the representative methlod could be set 
up without delay. 
3. The financial capacity of Baltimore 
3 .  7 Baltimore's economic and financial si tuation 
In the following chapter I analyze the economic, demographic and 
fiscal characteristics of Baltimore. The basic goal of my 
evaluation is to understand whether the fiscal capacity problems 
Baltimore has to face in the 9 0 ' s  are the result of a cyclical 
crisis or whether the one of a structural economic problem. 
l 2  The mandatory tasks include the supply of potable water, primary 
education, basic health- and social services, social assistance,public 
cemeteries, ensuring the rights of national and ethnic minorities. Although the 
other functions are optional, most of the local governments provide the same set 
of public services. 
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Analysis of the statistical and the budget data help me to 
understand the trends in two dimensions. The changes of Baltimore 
city over time is evaluated, as well as the trends are compared to 
the ones in the Baltimore region and the state of Maryland. 
I mainly focus on data which gives a basis for the calculation of 
Baltimore's Representative Expenditure and Revenue System. 
Demographic s i t u a t i o n  
Baltimore city's population declined considerably since 1965JTable 
A / 1 .  ) ,  in 1990 there were 200,000 inhabitants less: living in the 
city than in the 1960's. During the same period the population of 
the Baltimore region increased by about 25%, and the number of 
inhabitants in all jurisdictions in the region increased. 
If we consider intrastate and interstate migration, we can see that 
the loss of the population is due to the moving of households to 
the newer suburban counties in Maryland (Table A / 2 .  ) . More than 
half of the migrants to these new counties came from Baltimore city 
in the past 10 years. 
An important index which suggests the hardship of Baltimore city to 
cover necessary expenditures is the number of female householders 
and disabled persons. The proportion of the population in Baltimore 
city is higher than that of the region in these indexes. (Table 
A / 3 . )  




















The number of people with high level of education in the population 
is a very important index too, which determines the capability of 
the population to adjust to the changes in the economic structure. 
The proportion of people who were over 25 years and completed less 
than the 9th grade was 1,5% in the city while it was only 0,8% in 
the region. The proportion of inhabitants with high school and 
higher degree is lower in the city ( 6 4 , 4 % )  than in the region 
( 7 8 , 2 % ) .  13  
Income and poverty  
Baltimore's lag in income level and in income growth compared to 
the Baltimore region and Maryland is considerable. The median???? 
household income in Baltimore e.g. is hardly reach.es the half of 
the regional average counting in 1989 constant dollars. (Table 
Af4.1) The city suburb personal income per capita ratio also shows 
a decline over tfme to the advantage of the suburbs.(Table A/4.2) 
Also over time, the growth of income in the city decreased too. In 
Baltimore city the increase of the per capita income was 48% 
between 1960 and 1970. Between 1970  and 1980 the growth rate went 
down to 18% and in the last decade it was a bit higher, 20%.(Table 
Af4.3) 
The number of persons in poverty is also significa.ntly higher in 
the city (21,9 % )  than in the region (10,1%) or in Maryland (8,3%). 













The absolute increase in the poverty rate in Baltimore city has 
grown since 1960 from 15,2% to 21,9%, although the rate in 1990 
shows a small decline compared to the 1980 data (22,4%). (Table 
A I S . )  
The high level of poverty can be completed by the data of 
households living exclusively on social security (28,9%) and public 
assistance income (16,4%) (Table A / 6 . )  and the level of the 
unemployment rate (Table A/7). Although the public assistant 
recipients decreased between 1970 and 1980, the share of these 
people in the total number of recipients in the state that live in 
Baltimore was still 60% in 199014. The unemployment rate (7,7%) 
was the highest in the region in 1990 but in absolute terms the 
situation of the city has not worsened - but has not really 
improved either -since 1975 ( 9 . 2 % ) .  
Economy 
The structural change of the economy at the national level had a 
very big effect on Baltimore city. The city lost; many jobs in 
manufacturing between 1970 and 1990. The decline of jobs during the 
20 years reached 59,000 and the total jobs offered dropped by half . 
The decrease in jobs was considerable in infrastructure, and in 
trade too. The jobs offered by the service sector grew 
significantly during the past 20 years, while the government posts 
have decreased since 1980. (Table A / 8 )  





















A s  Baltimore is a port city it is worth looking at the data which 
show the turn over of foreign goods in the port (Table A / 9 ) .  
Although the turn over increased a bit in value during the past 20 
years, in constant dollars and weight it declined considerably. 
This structural economic change has a very important implication to 
the income level of inhabitants. First of all the salaries paid in 
the service sector are much lower than those paid in manufacturing 
and as we saw, the share of new manufacturing jobs are much lower 
than they us.ed to be. Secondly, to be able to revitalize 
Baltimore's economy and adjust it to the expectation of the new 
economic challenges, a high percentage of well educated people is 
needed which the city lacks. 
A good indicator which measures the economic position of the city 
for investors is new construction. Non-residential new construction 
in current value increased the most in the office, commercial and 
institutional category, while it declined in the industrial 
development and utility development field. Overall, the added value 
- in current terms - per year was the highest i.n 1984 and the 
lowest in 1976 and 1989 during the past 20 years (Table A/IO.I). 
The level shows considerable changes, and follows the regional 
pattern (Table A / 1 0 . 2 ) .  
Baltimore's share in the assessed value of residential, commercial, 
business and other property types in the region dropped from 25 % 
27 
number of building permits between 1 9 7 5  and 1 9 9 1  (Table A / 1  I ) . 
The new residential construction in Baltimore (measured by the 
number of building permits issued in a year) is really low ( 2 0 0 )  
compared to the level of the 6 0 ' s  and the 7 0 ' s  and t.o the trends of 
the region, (Table A . 1 2 , )  
The low level of the new constructions and the slowing down of the 
economic growth rate in the 1 9 9 0 ' s  caused significant losses in the 
property tax (the most important local tax) revenue of Baltimore's 
budget. Expectedly in 1994 and 1995 the revenues decrease in 
absolute terms too .The overall increase of the property tax base 
showed a slowing increase in the 90's but in 1 9 9 4  the city budget 
planned an absolute decrease in the value., 15 
Only the convention and the tourism industry can be evaluated as 
healthy because they yield a relatively stable revenue to the city, 
although the city can not rely on them as a flexible revenue source 
because the fluctuations in the revenue do not necessarily follow 
the economic growth in Baltimore , 
Revenues and e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n  Ba l t imore  Is budge t  
Calculating in 1989 constant dollars, the total revenue of 
'51 Source: Board of Estimates Recommendations FY 1994 .  





















Baltimore is fluctuating, and in 1990 it did not reach the 1980 
level. The change is mainly due to the dramatic decrease of federal 
grants in the budget from 33% of total revenues to 12,6%. The 
decline was levelled off by the increase of the state grants and 
local revenues (Table A / 1 3 ) .  
The biggest revenue source of the operating budget is the property 
tax (about 25%). To yield an appropriate level of revenue, - in 
the lack of the increase in the base - Baltimore c i t y  imposes the 
highest tax rate in the region (Table A / 1 4 ) .  Even so, this source 
does not yield a stable revenue, because the tax base goes down. 
Income taxes - which amount to about 6.5% of the operating budget 
can not grow either, because the residential population decreases, 
and the level of wages and salaries in the city do not grow with 
the inflation, and with the expansion of the economy. 
The other local taxes (the hotel, energy, and property transfer 
taxes) are not considerable, and they started to decrease also in 
1994.  
Utility charges revenues are increasing as the price goes up, but 
the yield goes to a separate fund which can only be spent for  the 
maintenance and improvement of the particular utility system. 
(Table A/15.) 
29 
Briefly, the city's own sources can hardly yield the same revenues 
in the 9 0 ' s  as in the previous decades, The situation was not too 
much better in the 8 0 ' s  either, but between 1984 and 1987 the city 
recovered from the previous crisis. 
Parallel with shaky budget revenues, Baltimore has to face high 
expenditures too, due to the high rate of unemployment, poverty and 
the related problems of crime, health and public service 
necessities, the deterioration of the housing stock. The city's 
expenditures per capita was the highest in the region in 1990 
(Table A/16)  even though it has declined since 1980.  
The per capita expenditures by different functions (Table A/17)  
show that Baltimore's costs were only lower in the education. For 
all the other functions the city spent much more than the regional 
average , 
To conclude, the causes of the fiscal problems of baltimore 
described above can be found in the difficulty of the city to 
retain the wealthier residential population and. attract more 
business and to assure a stable property tax base and an increasing 






















Tables for chapter 3.1 
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I n d c x  


































































Note: U.S. population includes military and federal cnployees stationed overseas. 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
BALTIMORE REGIONAL CaJWCIL OF GOVERNMENTS ++ January 1002 
TABLE A / 2  
COMPONENTS OF NET MIGRATION FOR MARYLAND BY JURISDICTIONAL GROUPINGS, 1980 - 1990 
(Combining IRS and U.S. Bureau of the Census Data) 
MARYLAND 
BALTIMORE CITY 

























































INTER- IRS I RS FOREIGN TOTAL NET 






























1 13,371 147,953 
23,568 128,595 
17,271 3,873 




























































160 511 37 -.--- WORCESTER -,. - .* I = ) .  oreign migration represemts U.S. taxpayers moving to and from abroed. It does NO) represent foreign immigration. 
# From the 1990 U.S. Census. 
Prepared by the Maryland offioe of Planning, Planning Data Services based on summary data prepared by the Jntemal Revecrue Setvice (IRS) 
Using the IRS individual Master File (IMF) of all Form 1040,1040A and 1040EZ return; and, the U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
TABLE A / 3  
THE NUMBER OF FEMALE HOUSEHOLDERS AND THE NuMBEeR OF DISABLED 
PERSONS (1990 some counties in MD and Baltimore city) 
Female Disabled 
Householders P e r s o n s  ( n o n -  
institutionalized) 
Queen Annex. 1,477 24,976 
Somerset c. 1 , 343 3,879 
Talbot c. 2,293 24,343 
Washington c. 7,277 88,695 
Baltimore city 58,820 559,656 
Source: Regional economic Indicators. 1992. Baltimore Regional Council 
of Governments 
TABLE A / 4  
MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME (CONSTANT 1989 DOLLARS) 
Regional Ame 
Total Arundel 
1959 21,734 24,808 
1960 22,153 25,431 
1961 22,667 26,172 
1962 23,197 26,937 
1963 23,741 27,?27 
1% 24,301 28,544 
1965 24,892 28,675 
1967 26,407 30,816 
1966 25,677 29,726. 
1960 27,322 31,946 
1969 28,153 33,117 
1970 27,971 32,971 
1971 27,966 33,051 
i 9 n  28,883 34,278 
1974 29,581 33,975 
1973 29,639 36,794 
1975 29,103 34,792 
1977 30,409 36,355 
1979 31,755 37,983 
1980 31,500 37,500 
1981 31,250 37,300 
1982 31,510 37,77V 
1984 33,097 40,485 
1985 33,968 41,771 
1976 30,021 35,901 
1978 31,603 37,796 
1983 32,000 38,500 
1986 34,862 43,099 
1987 3 5 , m  44,469 
1989 37,686 47,340 
1988 36,720 45,882 
1990 37,072 46,570 
Sources: U.S. Census for U.S. I BALTIMORE REGIONAL COUNCIL OF 
Balt. Balt. Carroll 
City County County 
19,223 27,614 19,440 
19,804 29,085 20,626 
20,104 29,964 21,250 
19,510 28,235 20,023 
20,423 30,903 22,760 
20,747 31,880 24,141 
21,077 32,888 25,607 
21,411 33,927 27,161 
21,752 35,ooo 28,810 
21,397 34,647 28,735 
21,186 3 4 , ~  28,814 
21,689 35,559 29,973 
21,778 36,082 30,670 
21,655 35,915 30,769 
21,116 35,098 30,963 
21,240 35,673 33,236 
21,676 36,521 35,064 
21,459 35,475 35,776 
21,387 35,735 32,402 
21,200 35,000 35,500 
21,100 34,900 35,400 
21,103 35,087 36,085 
21,150 35,500 37,500 
21,474 36,436 39,375 
21,745 37,140 40,152 
22,020 37,873 40,945 
22,298 38,613 41,753 
22,865 40,135 43,418 
22,580 39,366 42,577 
22,243 39,449 42,776 
data and Baltimore Region 1979; 
COVERNHENTS ++ January 1992 
I n d c x  
Harford Howard United Regional United 











24,388 28,805 79.0 
25,930 31,115 a i  .s 
27,570 33,611 23,810 04.1 88.7 
29,313 36,307 24,817 86.7 92.5 
30,500 39,219 25,812 89.4 96.2 
30,794 39,118 25,688 88.9 95.7 
30,791 39,124 25,503 88.8 95.0 
31,444 40,736 26,422 91.7 98.5 
31,830 41,753 27,093 94.1 101.0 
32,756 42,056 26,408 93.9 98.4 
31,729 41,575 25,821 92.4 96.2 
33,126 43,064 26,265 95.3 97.9 
33,840 43,060 26,656 96.5 98.6 
35,519 45,811 27,639 100.3 102.3 
36,159 46,251 27,573 100.8 102.8 
36,000 66,m 26,833 100.0 100.0 
35,900 45,900 26,529 99.2 98.9 
36,355 47,256 26,541 100.0 98.9 
37,000 50,000 26,538 101 -6 98.0 
38,511 53,497 27,203 105.1 101.4 
39,041 54,195 27,688 107.8 103.2 
110.7 1Q5.9 
40,125 55,618 28,451 113.6 106.0 
40,678 56,364 28,538 116.6 106.4 
41,238 57,079 28,906 119.6 107.7 
39,579 54,902 28,421 
117.7 1 0 6 . 1  40,875 57,034 . 28,463 
other data estimated by Regional Council s t a f f .  
TABLE A/4.2 

































Total Personal Income 
(mil l ions of 198-1 Ratio: 
Belt .  Suburban City/ 



































































































Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Personal Income per Capita 
(1989 S per capita)  
Balt .  Suburban 




































































Baltimore Regional Comcil  of G o v e r m t s  estimates (e) 
BALTIMORE REGIONAL COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS ++ January 1992 
T a b l e  Al4.3 
The changes of the personal per capita income in Baltimore city 
between 1960 and 1980 
Per capita income % change 
1960 7 ,866  
1970 11 ,647  
1980 13 ,848  
1990 1 6 , 7 3 8  
2 1 . 9  
1 0 . 1  
8 . 3  
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Maryland Department of 
Fiscal Services for  Maryland, 1987-1990, Baltimore Regional Council 
of Governments 
TABLE A/5 
POVERTY RATE (2)  
l n d e x  
Regional A m  Balt. Balt. Carroll Harford Houard United Baltimore United 
Total Arudcl Ci ty  C m t y  States Region States 
1959e 11.1% 8.2% 15.2% 4.9% 12.1% 10.4% 9.7% 22.1% 95.5 188.5 
site 7.1% 6.8% 8.7% 4.7% 11.9% 8.7% 7.5% 18.1% 
Black . 25.6% 16.4% 27.4% 8.7% 18.2% 26.3% 26.8% 55.1% 
1969 11.0% 6.7% 18.0% 4.5% 8.0% 7.4% 5.0% 12.1% 95.0 103.4 
m i t e  6.4% 5.2% 10.0% 4.2% 7.8% 6.1% 3.8% 9.5% 
















i s  far too m a l l  for jur isdict ional  level estimates 13.6% 
13.4% 
13.0% 
(Current Population Survey's s a p l e  s i r e  










Persons of  Spanish or ig in  m y  k of any race. 
Total includes persons of  other races, not shocm separately. 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Poprlation Reports, Series P-60, No. 161 
( in National Center f o r  Education Statistics, D i g e s t  of  Education Statistics); 
State and County Data Book, 1986; and Sta t is t i ca l  Abstract of  the U.S., loo0 
B a l t i m r e  Regional Comcil of  C o v e r m t s  s t a f f  estimates (e) 
BALTIMOUE RECIOUAL COUNCIL O f  GOVERNMENTS ++ Jarn~ary 1992 
TABLE A / 6  
HOUSEHOLDS LIVING ON SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE INCOME 
Households 
with SOC. sec. 
Baltimore 
Metropolitan 
Region 21 5,646 
Households 
with public assistance 
67,812 
Baltimore city 79,760 (28 .9%)  45,390 (16 .4%)  
Baltimore county 71,417 11,106 
Anne Aroundel c. 29 888 5,233 
Harford c. 8,957 1,598 
Carol1 9,754 1,503 
Howard 8,957 1,598 
Source: Regional Economic Indicators. 1992, Baltimore Regional Council 
of Governments. 
TABLE A / 7  
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
I n d e x  
R e g i m l  Arne 
Total Arundel 
1975 7.1 5.5 
1976 7.4 5.8 
1977 7.0 5.4 
1978 6.4 4.8 
1979 6.7 5.1 
1980 7.4 5.3 
1981 8.3 6.3 
1982 9.8 7.4 
1983 7.8 6.2 
1984 6.2 4.7 
1985 5.3 3.7 
1 986 5.2 3.5 
1987 4.7 3.2 
1988 4.9 3.3 
1989 4.0 2.7 



















Balt. Carrolt Harford Howard NarylMd 
comty 
6.9 5.3 4.8 6.8 3.9 
5.5 5.0 7.1 4.1 6.7 
5.2 4.7 6.7 3.8 6.1 
6.3 4.9 5.3 3.8 5.6 
6.5 5.4 5.7 3.8 5.9 
7.7 6.3 6.3 3.8 6.5 
8.1 7.9 7.1 4.9 7.3 
10.1 9.4 9.1 5.6 8.4 
7.7 6.4 7.5 3.9 6.9 
6.1 4.8 6.3 3.2 5 .4 
4.7 3.7 5.2 2.3 4.6 
4.4 3.7 4.8 2.1 4.5 
4.0 4.0 4.2 2.3 4.2 
4.3 3.2 4.6 2.5 4.5 
3.5 2.6 3.9 2.0 3.7 





































Sources: Hd. Dept. of EcocKmic 6 Enploylnent Developtent (DEED); US. Bureau of lsbor Statistics 
BALTIKN REGIONAL COUNCIL OF COMRNCKNTS ++ JUUMW 1002 






























1000 OF FULL AND PART-TIME .JOBS) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1970-80 1980-90 
479.2 456.1 466.7 453.1 463.6 (12.5) (3.1) 
60.1 52.4 52.7 46.5 43.4 (7.4) (9.3) 
0.4  0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1 (0.2) 
18.8 15.2 15.0 17.4 20.0 (3.8) 5 .o 
40.9 36.7 37.2 28.7 23.1 (3.7) (14.1) 
100.2 79.2 69.1 54.5 41.1 (31.1) (28.0) 
(14.4)  (16.9) 14.1 45.4 37.5 31 .O 19.9 
54.8 41.7 38.1 34.6 27.0 (16.7) (11.1) 
100.3 89.7 85.7 86.0 78.7 (14.6) (7.0) 
27.5 26.3 ZS.l 25.8 26.7 (2.4) 1.6 
n.8 0.4 60.6 60.2 52.0 (12.2) (8.6) 






































































( 3 . 0 )  








~ng . ,  acct., etc. 3.1 5 .4 3.8 4.9 11.1 0.7 
Pvt. household 7.2 4.9 7.9 ?.8 3.7 0.7 
Miscellaneous 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 (0.0) 
t 
GOVERNNEWT 81 .O 91.2 102.0 82.1 86.9 21 .o 
Local 41.2 44.7 50.0 34.4 40.0 8.8 
State 15.2 23.0 32.1 32.6 32.0 16.9 
federal c i v i l i a n  16.4 18.3 15.1 11.3 11.0 (1 -3) 
fedecat m i  I i tary 8.2 5.2 4.8 3.8 3.9 ( 3 . 4 )  




















( 4 . 1 )  
(0.9) 
BALTIWORE REGIOMAL COUWClL OF GOVERNMENTS ++ January 1992 
TABLE A / 9  
FOREIGN WATERBORNE TRADE BALTIMORE CITY 
Value (millions of dollars) 
I n d e x  
Port of Baltimore 
Total Imports Exports 
1975 8,180 3,233 
1976 8,249 3,075 
1977 8,381 3,364 
1978 11,343 4,898 
1979 12,763 5,314 
1980 15,289 6,245 
1981 '15,041 6,072 
1982 14,224 5,668 
1903 12,797 5,039 
1984 14,630 8,973 
1985 14,687 9,245 
1986 15,527 10,775 
1987 16,840 11,559 
1988 18,179 11;660 
1989 18,660 11,118 










5 , 657 
5 , 442 
4,752 




United States Ports 
Total Imports Exports 
128,761 65,894 62,867 
152,012 85,602 66,410 
172,839 105,782 67,057 
197,920 118,865 79,055 
244,976 145,349 99,627 
296,670 1 74 , 400 122 , 270 
319,255 190,761 128,494 
283,216 163,171 120,045 
269,391 164,222 105,169 
307,949 201,677 106,272 
316,567 220,410 96,157 
324,482 230,821 93,661 
361,502 256,911 104,591 
400,682 267,807 132,875 
441#309 290,198 151,111 





































Ueight (millions of short tons of 2000 povlds each) 















































































































































Source: Maryland Port Achinistration, Foreign Comnerce Statistical Report 
BALTIMORE REGIONAL COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS ++ Jnruiarv 1009 
TARJ,E A/10.1 


































Office Comnercial I-- 
trial 
WA NA NA 
NA NA NA 
NA NA NA 
NA NA NA 
NA NA NA 
5.4 12.4 9.5 
16.2 9.8 26.8 
18.3 11.5 5.3 
112.8 135.5 108.8 
34.7 41.1 38.9 
92.4 51.3 10.4 
28.9 33.2 5.1 
30.9 51.8 9.0 
8.8 14.9 9.0 
45.3 23.7 9.1 



































BALTIMORE REGIONAL COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS ++ January 1992 
TABLE A/10.2 
NON-RESIDENTIAL NEW CONSTRUCTION 

















































































































































43 , 626 
45 , 449 





92 , 269 


























Includes both public and pr ivate m - r e s i d e n t i a t  buildings; does not i n c l d e  m i l i t a r y  f a c i l i t i e s .  
Sources: Baltimore Regional C a n c i l  of  G o v e r m t s  building permit f i l e  
U.S. Census Bureau, Construction Reports, series 
( i n  S ta t is t ica l  Abstract of the U.S., 1990, Table 1254) 



















BALTIMORE REGIONAL COUNClL OF GOVERNMENTS ++ January 1992 
TABLE A / 1 1  
ASSESSED VALUE OF PROPERTY BY TYPE 
Regional &ne Balt. Balt. Carroll Harford Howard 
Total A r v d e l  City C m t y  
Total FY91 46,322 9,997 9,440 15,526 2,490 3,063 5,786 
Residential 23,282 5,607 3,697 7,745 1,406 1,876 2,951 
Ccnnnerc i a l 9,537 1,792 2,560 3,287 282 417 1,199 
___________--___________________________--------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Business 9,512 1.53 2,427 3,369 4% 400 1,288 
Other 3,991 1,064 756 1,125 308 390 348 
Source: Uaryland Departumt of AssesS(Rents, Amual Report 
BALTIMORE REGIONAL COUNCIL OF COMRNUEWTS ++ Januwy 1992 
I 
TABLE A / 1 2  
HOUSING CONSTRUCTION 












































































































































































































































































































































1 ' 6 6  
1,338 
1,111 





























U.S. Census Bureau, Current Construction Rcport C20-9007 (August  1990) 
Maryland Department of Ecoclanic and Enploywent Development, Marytand Stat is t ica l  Abstract, 1990-91 
Baltimore Regional Council of C o v e r m t s  building p e n i t  f i l e  
BALTIMORE REGIONAL COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS * January 1992 
TABLE A/13 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES BY SOURCE BALTIMORE CITY 
H i l l i o n s  of 1989 d o l l a r s  
TOTAL LOCAL Property Income Other INTER- Federal State OTHER 



























































































FYOO 28 086 773 426 117 230 906 264 632 407 
* Service charges, fines and forfeitures, miscellaneous and debt proceeds. 
Source: Department of Fiscat Serv ices ,  Local G o v e r m t  Finances in Haryland 
BALTIMORE REGIONAL COUNCIL OF GOVERNHENTS ++ January 1992 
TABLE A / 1 4  




















































































Balt .  














































































































Average fate; residential  owner-occqied 4%; a l l  other property SOX. 
** Wrnicipal rates may be di f ferent  i n  these cant ies  
Source: Maryland Oepartnmt of Assessments 
BALTIWRE REGIWAL COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS 
and Taxation, Amual Report. 























































TABLE A / 1 5  
THE MAIN REVENUES OF BALTIMORE CITY BETWEEN 1988-1994 
(in million dollars) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Total 1.723 1,906 2.019 2 . 006 n o d .  n o d .  2.165 
Local 
taxes n o d .  n .d  n .d  n.d 645.3 666.9 666.9 
Property 
tax 373.1 409.4 436.7 453 . 8 n o d .  n o d .  475.8 
Prop. tax 
base 6.355 6.963 7.427 7 . 783 n.d  8.230 8.228 
(billion 
Income 
tax 110.3 115.3 116.7 119.5 114.7 121.6  123.6 
Hotel 
tax 5 . 2  5.8 6.4  7 .9  7 . 8  8 7.9 
Energy 
tax 17.0  15.4 n o d  n .d  15.4  1 5 . 0  14.3 
Transfer 
tax 12.5 13.8  13 .2  12.3 9 .4  9 .5  9.7 
Uti1 . 
fees 116.7 122.2 132.4 130.2 130.2 151.7 156.2 
State 
grants 546 579 632 nod. nod. ? 3 
Feder . 
grants 364 286 264 197.9 nod. 291 288.5 
21 . 6  24.2 24.0 27.8 28.4 CDBG n .d  22.7 
Source: Annual budgets of Baltimore for FY 1988-1994 
TARTS .A/16 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES PER CRPTTA (19g9 $ PER CAPITA) 
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2 , 874 
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1 , 528 
1,335 



































1 , 267 
1,280 
1,215 































8 m  
8823 
1,920 




















































Note: Data is for counties only, not including municipalities; includes debt service payments 
Local g o v e r m t  expenditures = Total operations (operating + capital )  + expenditures by boards 
(education, comnnity colleges, social services, health,  l ibrary) .  
Sources: Maryland Department of Fiscal Resources, Local G o v e r m t  Finances in  Haryland (annual) 
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TABLE A / 1 7  
LOCAL EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA 














2.081 .7  
151.6  
265 . 2 
297 . 1 
273 . 9 
886 . 2 
68 .9  
138.9 
97 .7  
Region 
2793 . 4 
229 
439 . 1 
436.8 
567 . 8 


























3.2 The Representative Tax System in Baltimore 
In Maryland both the tax capacity and the tax effort index 
calculations are prepared annually for  about ten years by the 
Maryland Department of Fiscal Services on the basi.s of the above 
described method developed by ACIR. 
The revenues of counties and Baltimore city are published each year 
in the report on "Local Government Finances in Maryland. The 
analysis calculates the Representative Revenues of the counties and 
Baltimore city including the revenues of eight taxes (see footnote 
7), calculates the RE index and presents a combined index too, in 
which it includes the state grants. Federal and state grants 
amount to 34% of local revenues in Maryland, out of which 27% is 
17 state grant. The federal grants are excluded from t he  analysis. 
The calculation includes the following steps.  
First for each of the eight taxes and the user fees the 
representative tax base is worked o u t .  The representative tax base 
elements are listed in the box below. 
'' The report is required by state law and includes uniform information. 
l 7  The Department of Fiscal Services does not include the federal grants 
in its calculation. The reason behind it, according to their study ( "  Fiscal 
Capacity and Effort of Local Governments in Maryland.") is that '' it 
inaccurately reflects the local impact. " Although this justification is not 
clear, I was not able to get the necessary data to include federal grants. 
Therefore I only included it into the calculation of the Representative Tax 






















The state representative average rate is counted by dividing the 
total actual revenues by the total representative tax base of all 
counties and Baltimore city. The total value of the representative 
tax base and the total outlays on the state level and on the county 
level are shown in Appendix B., Tables B/1-8 after this chapter. 
The local tax capacity is computed by applying the representative 
tax rate to the local values of the representative tax bases for  
the eight taxes and user fees. 
The representative rates for the different taxes and the 
representative yield of Baltimore city is calculated in Appendix D 
after this chapter. 





















Baltimore's tax capacity in 1989 
Tax Tax base 
(in thousand) 
Property tax 7,044,103 
Income tax 4,704,813 
Sales tax 
on utilities . 698,353 
Hotel tax 59,692 
Transfer tax 761 , 298 
Record, tax 1,483,475 
Admissions and 
amusement tax 67,480 
Water and 




0 . 030 
0 , 023? 
0 021 






21 4,002 , 180 
109 , 374,660 
14,783 , 923 
2,924 , 933 
8,374,278 
7 , 41 7 , 375 
4,453,695 
57,150,216 
41 8,481 , 260 
The tax capacities of the counties are compared with each other 
using the division of the per capita representative tax yield at 
the state level and at the local level. (The representative tax 
yield is divided by t h e  to ta l  number of the  population.) The index 
is shown on Tables B/1-8. 
'' Representative Tax Capacity 
35 
The total capacity index of the jurisdictions are computed by 
dividing the total representative yield by the number of the total 
population for the locality and for  the state too. The index is the 
division of the two numbers. The total capacity of Baltimore is 
shown below, the capacities of other counties are shown on Table 
B/9 . 
The representative tax yield of Baltimore is: 418,481,260 
The population in 1989 was: 747,000 
The total capacity per capita: 560.22 
The State capacity per capita is: 4,666,078,260 / 4,622,000 = 
1,009.98 
The per capita capacity index is: 560.22/1,009.98 == 55,4% 
Table B/9 shows, that compared to the state average Baltimore city 
has the lowest capacity in Maryland with 56%. It a l s o  shows that 
Baltimore city has the highest tax effort in the state which is 
nearly twice as high as 18 of the other 23 jurisdictions. 
In the second step the state grants are also taken into 
consideration. By including state aid we get a picture on how this 
grant changes the fiscal disparities. Unfortunately federal grants 
are not included in the study, as already mentioned above. State 
grants include shared taxes like the alcohol, tobacco, and 
transportation taxes, and the direct grants for different purposes 
like education, police etc. Total state transfers are just added to 
36 
the total value of the tax yield, which gives a combined 
representative revenue system. The combined index is calculated 
like in the case of taxes: the per capita state a:id at the state 
level is divided by the local per capita state aid. Table B/10. 
shows, that state grants reduce disparities, but even so, the 
combined index in Baltimore city remains the lowest. 
State transfers 
to Ba1timo1-e’~ 453,011,864 
Combined tax yield 871,493,124 
Per capita combined yield: 1166.68 
Per capita combined state yield: 6,925,432,597 / 4,622,000 = 
1498.36 
Index: 77.9% 
For Baltimore the total amount of federal grants can be added to 
the total tax yield which was $286,000,000 in 1989. This amount can 
not be compared with the other counties, because we do not have 
information on their federal grants revenues, but clan be useful to 
compare the city’s capability to cover operating expenditures from 
the three types of sources altogether. 
l9 State aid to Baltimore city was adjusted downwards in the calculation. 
The reason behind that was that the city provides some portion of the high way 
maintenance, police and parks itself which the state reimburses. The other 
counties do not have these responsibilities, the state directly delivers these 
services therefore they do not appear in the total amount of the state grants. 














If we look at the actual tax yield and compare it to the 
representative yield, we get the tax effort of the jurisdiction. 
The results of the tax effort calculation is shown in table 9 .  
The process of calculation of the tax effort for Baltimore city: 
1. Total actual tax yield = 688,503,634 
2, Total representative tax yield = 418,481,260 
3,  The tax effort is : 1 . / 2 . =  164% 
It is not surprising, that Baltimore city has the highest tax 
effort in Maryland, with 164%20 The high tax effort can be 
explained by the high level of property tax rate which is more than 
twice as much as in the other counties, Other ta:xes are in the 
higher range too. 21 
2o The state wide tax effort is l o o % ,  because the representative tax yield 
equals the actual yield. 
21 The property transfer tax is 1.5% , while the state average is less than 
1 % -  The hotel tax is 6% - the highest rate applied. Energy taxes are incomparable 






















Tables for the Calculation of the Representative Revenues 
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TABLE B/1 
TAX CAPACITY DATABASE - PROPERTY TAX - F Y  1989 
S U B D I V I S I O N  
___-_----------- - ----------- 
ALLEGANY 
ANNE ARUNDEL 
BALTIMORE C I T Y  
BALTIMORE COUNTY 
CALVERT 
CAROL I NE 
CARROLL 























11 , 367,826,000 
1 , 515,874,000 
271,330,000 













216 , 408,000 
757,392,000 
1 , 401 , 873 , 000 
1,025,542,000 




LOCAL TAX Y I E L D  TAX TAX 
RECE I PTS PER CAP CPCTY. EFFORT 
22,995,337 309 . 08 68 87 
19 1,871 , 404 455.10 104 84 
415 , 563,534 556.31 55 194 
__--_-__-_-_-- - ------- ------ -__--- -_ --- - -- - - ------- ------ -__e--  
314,081,519 460 19 97 9 1  
34,160,630 704 . 34 182 74 
7,774,315 306 08 62 94 
24,110,137 340 . 06 72 9 1  
40,952,233 342 12 84 78 
36,730 , 269 379.05 100 73 
10,992,488 362.79 81 86 
58,058,928 410.60 89 88 
10,362,123 388 . 09 96 78 
65,621,063 388.75 79 94 
106,854,154 646 . 03 139 89 
6,335,525 368.34 96 73 
567,890,309 798.50 159 96 
343,427,724 494.78 9 1  104 
12,965,113 4013 . 90 106 73 
22,010,260 305 . 70 77 76 
4,854 , 683 246.43 64 74 
9,259,676 32:O . 70 157 40 
35,783,220 303 25 69 84 
25,573,883 353 . 72 83 82 
43 , 389,908 1 , 144.85 268 82 
Source: Fiscal Capacity and Effort of Locla Governments in Maryland. 




















TABLE B / 2  
TAX CAPACITY DATABASE - INCOME TAX - FY 1989 
C A L V E R T  
CAROL I NE 
CARROLL 







K E N T  
MONTGOMERY 
P R I N C E  GEORGE ' S  
QUEEN A N N E ' S  
ST. MARY ' S  
SOMERSET 
T A L B O T  
WASHINGTON 
W I C O M I C O  
WORCESTER 
Source: I b i d .  
T A X A B L E  




























L O C A L  




























A C T U A L  






















































T A X  


























TABLE B / 3  
TAX CAPACITY DATABASE - SALES TAX ON UTILITIES - FY 1989 
ACTUAL 
TAXABLE LOCAL TAX Y I E L D  TAX 
BASE R E C E I P T S  PER CAP CPCTY. 
ALLEGANY 62,783,377 0 . 00 87 
ANNE ARUNDEL 410,901,828 9,214,441 21-86 101 
BALTIMORE C I T Y  698,353,208 27,200,491 36.41 97 
BALTIMORE COUNTY 722,377,592 24,035,953 35.22 109 
-------------- -------------- -----_____ _ _ _ _ _  -------------- c------------- - - -_______  _ _ _ _ _ _  
S U B D I V I S I O N  
_______-------  ------------ 
CALVERT 
CAR0 L I NE 
CARROLL 





0 . 00 63 
0 . 00 152 
0 . 00 74 
0 . 00 98 
CHARLES 62,985,375 0 . 00 67 
DORCHESTER 27,459,967 0 . 00 94 
FREDERICK . 159,544,942 0 . 00 117 





131,098,402 0 . 00 80 
190,616,352 0 . 00 119 
11,907,918 0 . 00 72 
782,842,443 12,592,538 17.71 114 
PRINCE GEORGE'S 651,177,554 21,571,297 31.08 97 
QUEEN A N N E ' S  21,081,110 0 0 00 68 
SJ. M A R Y ' S  49,957,617 0 . 00 72 
SOMERSET 15,740,016 0 0 00 83 
TALBOT 11,521,987 0 . 00 43 
WASHINGTON 80,077,241 0 00 78 
W I C O M I  CO 70,697,886 0 . 00 101 































TABLE B / 4  
T A X  C A P A C I T Y  D A T A B A S E  - SALES T A X  ON H O T E L S  AND M O T E L S  - FY 1989 
T A X A B L E  L O C A L  
S U B D I V I S I O N  B A S E  R E C E I P T S  ---------------- -------------- ----_---__-___ ---------------- --------------- -- --__ 
A L L E G A N Y  3,651,523 93,070 
ANNE ARUNDEL 45,139,411 2,588,293 
B A L T I M O R E  C I T Y  59,692,512 6,119,418 
B A L T I M O R E  COUNTY 42,574,561 3,074,612 
C A L V E R T  
C A R 0  L I NE 
CARROLL 





CHARLES 7,227,407 322,787 
DORCHESTER 1,379,460 0 
F R E D E R I C K  10,228,689 0 
GARRETT 7,636,9 18 192,221 
HARFORD ' 12,661,302 0 
HOWARD 13,519,922 0 
K E N T  1,538,252 0 
MONTGOMERY 60,337,034 3,757,470 
P R I N C E  GEORGE'S 5 1,801,499 3,035,397 
QUEEN A N N E ' S  850,597 0 
ST. MARY ' S  2,994,970 0 
SOMERSET 919,440 0 
T A L B O T  4,214,811 240,361 
W I C O M  I C 0  8,873,975 86,309 
WORCESTER 109,230,063 3,387,824 
WASHINGTON 12,840,818 0 
Source: I b i d .  
A C T U A L  
T A X  Y I E L D  





. 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 
3.33 . 00 . 00 
7.20 
. 00 . 00 . 00 
5.28 
4.37 . 00 . 00 . 00 
8.58 . 00 
1.19 
89 . 39 
T A X  





















































TABLE R / 5  
TAX CAPACITY DATABASE - PROPERTY TRANSFER TAX - FY 1989 
S U B D I V I S I O N  
_-------------__ ____------ --__ 
ALLEGANY 
ANNE ARUNDEL 
BALTIMORE C I T Y  
BALTIMORE COUNTY 
CALVERT 
CAROL I N E 
CARROLL 










QUEEN A N N E ' S  


























































. 00 . 00 . 00 . 13 
. 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 
. 00 
73-16 
17 . 13 
72 . 30 
72.46 . 00 . 00 . 00 
47.41 . 00 . 00 . 00 























































Source : I b i d  . 
TABLE B / 6  
TAX CAPACITY DATABASE - RECORDATION TAX - FY 1989 
S U B D I V I S I O N  
---------------- ___ _ ---- 
A L L E G A N Y  
ANNE ARUNDEL 
B A L T I M O R E  C I T Y  
B A L T I M O R E  COUNTY 
C A L V E R T  
C A R O L I N E  
CARROLL 
C E C I L  
CHARLES 
DORCHESTER 






P R I N C E  G E O R G E ' S  
QUEEN A N N E ' S  
ST. M A R Y ' S  
SOMERSET 
T A L B O T  
WASHINGTON 
W I C O M I C O  
WORCESTER 
T A X A B L E  
B A S E  
--------------  
159 , 215,909 



























4,823 , 644 
562,387 
7 , 259 , 697 
585,568 
5,824,658 
7 , 863 , 937 
352 , 270 
31,973,014 






1 , 440,866 
1,619,512 
A C T U A L  





110 . 92 
21.07 
42.15 
12 . 58 
37 . 26 
20 . 84 





47 . 54 





201 . 23 































T A X  



























Source: I b i d .  
TABLE B / 7  
TAX CAPACITY DATABASE - ADMISSIONS & AMUSEMENT TAX - FY 1989 
TAXABLE LOCAL 
SUB0 I V I S  I O N  BASE RECEIPTS _--------------- -------------- -------------- _ -  -----_ 
ALLEGANY . 3,153,223 251,103 
ANNE ARUNDEL 36,077,084 2,733,997 
BALTIMORE C I T Y  67,480,228 4,869,164 
BALTIMORE COUNTY 49,924,663 4,239,903 
CALVERT 
CAROL I NE 
CARROLL 













HARFORD 4,980,988 273,761 
HOWARD 17,835,659 896,123 
KENT 1,325,585 71,167 
MONTGOMERY 38,582,122 2,497,626 
PRINCE GEORGE'S 83,353,859 6,745,473 
QUEEN A N N E ' S  781,223 39,034 
ST. MARY 'S  3,252,498 84,409 
SOMERSET 415,807 16,699 
TALBOT 2,114,515 28,469 
WASHINGTON 6,537,652 398,608 
W ICOM I CO 4,674,938 217,735 




PER CAP CPCTY. EFFORT 
3.38 51 121 
6.48 103 115 
6.52 109 110 
6.21 88 129 
TAX Y I E L D  TAX TAX 
----------- -__-__ _ _ _ -  --  -__-__ - - 
. 46 55 15 . 09 54 3 
2.34 41 105 
1.. 67 34 89 
1.. 23 7 1  32 . 68 28 44 
2.66 70 70 
6 . 80 172 73 
1.62 36 84 
51 . 42 130 76 
4.14 93 82 
3.51 66 98 
9.72 145 123 
1.22 29 76 
1.17 54 39 
-85 26 61 
1.02 9 1  20 
3.38 67 93 
3.01 78 7 1  
18.59 1104 31 
Source :  I b i d .  
TABLE B./8 
TAX CAPACITY DATABASE - WATER & SEWER TAXES - FY 1989 
ACTUAL 
TAXABLE LOCAL TAX YIELD TAX TAX 
S U B D I V I S I O N  BASE RECE I PTS PER CAP CPCTY. EFFORT 
ALLEGANY 865,257,000 10,636,061 142.96 68 152 
ANNE ARUNDEL 7,502,223,000 53,758,528 127 . 5 1  104 88 
BALTIMORE CITY 7,044,103,000 106 , 592,390 142.69 55 187 
_________-- - - - - -  -------------- -------------- ----------_ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ -  ----__-____---  ---------__ _ _ _ - _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  
BALTIMORE COUNTY 11,367,826,000 86,080,670 126.13 97 93 
CALVERT 1,515,874,000 2,137,062 44.06 182 17 
CAROL I NE 271,330,000 1,222,776 48.14 62 56 
CARROLL 1,718,973,000 5,918,851 49 . 45 84 42 
C E C I L  872,559,000 4,904,645 ti9 . 18 72 69 
CHARLES 1,662,485,000 11,257,754 11.6 . 18 100 83 
DORCHESTER 420,373,000 2,336,572 7'7.11 81  69 
FREDERICK 2,159,809,000 9,396,953 66 . 46 89 54 
GARRETT 439,937,000 1,566,645 58.68 96 44 
HARFORD 2,301,459,000 9,644,639 57 . 14 79 52 
HOWARD 3,958,694,000 14,676,625 88.73 139 46 
KENT 283,908,000 1,106,214 64.31 96 48 
MONTGOMERY 19,445,889,000 146,061,838 205 . 37 159 93 
PRINCE GEORGE'S 10,868,458,000 141,266,185 203 . 52 91  160 
QUEEN ANNE'S  582,698,000 2,205 , 380 68.70 106 47 
ST. MARY 'S  950,721,000 3,301,394 45.85 77 43 
SOMERSET 216,408,000 1,412,250 71.69 64 80 
TALBOT 757,392,000 1,406,318 50.23 157 23 
WASHINGTON 1,401,873,000 12,525 , 327 106.15 69 110 
W I COM IC0 1,025,542,000 4,018,627 55.58 83 48 
WORCESTER 1,747,123,000 10,606,622 279.86 268 75 
--------------- -------------- 
79 , 380,914,000 644,040,326 
Source : I b i d .  
TABLE B / 9  
TAX CAPACITY DATABASE - TOTALS - F Y  1989 
ACTUAL 
PER CAP CPCTY. EFFORT 
TAX Y I E L D  TAX TAX 
---------- ---_-- _ - _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  ---------- ------ ---- _ ___-_-_--------- 
S U B D I V I S I O N  
ALLEGANY 613.05 64 95 
ANNE ARUNDEL 953.11 104 91 
BALTIMORE C I T Y  921.69 55 164 
.BALTIMORE COUNTY 995.01 100 98 
CALVERT 
CAROL I NE 
CARROLL 










QUEEN A N N E ' S  




W ICOM I CO 
WORCESTER 
894 . 00 153 58 
529 . 30 64 82 
676.73 07 77 







676 . 44 
1,554.64 








































Source : I b i d .  
TABLE B/10 
TAX CAPACITY DATABASE - STATE A I D  CALCULATOR - FY 1989 
STATE 
S U B D I V I S I O N  A I D  I N D E X  
ALLEGANY 45,412,987 125 
ANNE ARUNDEL 198,490,352 96 
BALTIMORE C I T Y  453,011,864 124 
BALTIMORE COUNTY 260,418,073 78 
STATE A I D  







--_--- - _ _ _ _ _  
CALVERT 25,694,091 108 2081.54 139 153 -14 
CAROL I NE 17,823,105 144 1347.76 90 64 26 
CARROLL 66,220,559 113 1434.11 96 87 9 
CECIL 41,432,440 120 1323 . 60 88 73 15 
CHARLES 59,426,511 125 1604 . 66 107 98 9 
DORCHESTER 21,361,875 144 1476.22 98 76 22 
FREDERICK 80,304,878 116 1527.34 102 95 7 
GARRETT 23,683,393 181 1757.47 117 86 . 3 1  
HARFORD 91,476,346 111 1391 . 72 93 84 9 
HOWARD 78,175,368 97 1919.67 128 143 -15 
KENT 10,623,933 126 1530.29 102 90 12 
MONTGOMERY 246,768,342 7 1  1947 . 10 130 158 -28 
PRINCE GEORGE'S 334,306,87 1 99 1404.40 94 91  3 
QUEEN A N N E ' S  17,601,876 112 1588.92 106 103 3 
ST. MARY 'S  38,930,286 111 1291.15 86 74 12 
SOMERSET 15,482,891 161 1379.44 92 59 33 
TALBOT 11,194,331 82 1912.81 127 149 -22 
WASHINGTON 62,848,214 109 1244.24 83 70 13 
W I C O M I C O  41,132,017 116 1385.56 92 81 11 
WORCESTER 17,533,734 95 2827.41 188 234 -46 
---------____- 
2,259,354,337 





















Calculating the Representative Revenues for Baltimore 
P r o p e r t y  t a x  
1. Representative local tax base = 7,044,103,000 
2.  Representative tax rate 
Total state outlays/Total state representative tax base 
2,411,618,435 / 79,380,914,000 =0.030 
3 .  Representative tax yield = 214,002,180 
Income t a x  
1. Representative local tax base = 4,704,813,162 
2.  Representative tax rate 
Total state outlays/Total state representative tax base 
1,174,867,251 / 50,537,542,669 = 0.023 
3.  Representative tax yield = 109,374,660 
S a l e s  t a x  on u t i l i t i e s  
1 .  Representative local tax base = 698,353,208 
2. Representative tax rate 
Total state outlays/Total state representative tax base 
94,616,673 / 4,469,405,325 = 0.021 





















S a l e s  t a x  on hotels 
1. Representative local tax base = 59,692,512 
2. Representative tax rate = 
Total state outlays/Total state representative tax base 
22,897,762 / 468,340,043 = 0,049 
3.  Representative tax yield = 2,924,933 
P r o p e r t y  t r a n s f e r  t a x  
1 .  Representative local tax base = 761,298,400 
2. Representative tax rate 
Total state outlays/Total state representative tax base 
172,209,615 / 15,627,725,400 = 0.011 
3. Representative tax yield = 8,389,047 
R e c o r d a t i o n  t a x  
1. Representative local tax base = 1,483,475,455 
2. Representative tax rate 
Total state outlays/Total state representative tax base 
132,740,298 / 26,204,904,043 = 0.005 
3 .  Representative tax yield = 7,417,375 
A d m i s s i o n s  and Amusemen t t a x  
1. Representative local tax base = 67,480,228 
2.  Representative tax rate 
Total state outlays/Total state representative tax base 
25,188,116 / 383,001,844 = 0.0066 
41 
3. Representative tax yield = 4,453,695 
W a t e r  and sewer t a x e s  
1. Representative local tax base = 7,044,103,000 
2. Representative tax rate 
Total state outlays/Total state representative tax base 
644,040,326 / 79,380,914,000 = 0.008 
3. Representative tax yield = 57,150,216 
Total representative tax yield = 418,495,809 
S t a t e  g r a n t s  
Total outlays = Representative base = 453,011,864 







3.3 The Representative Expendi tures in Bal timore 
The Representative Expenditure System of Baltimore was computed 
with the help of a study22 which measured the relative fiscal 
capacities of the different counties in Maryland and also on the 
basis of the annual tax capacity and representative expenditure 
report of the state, 23 
The Representative Expenditures by functions are computed on the 
basis of an average unit cost/ workload measure for  each function, 
taking into consideration all the outlays of the local governments 
of the state spent on the particular function and the amount of the 
workload measure at the local level of the particular function. The 
description of the workload measures can be found in Appendix D, 
Baltimore's RE is calculated through the same process in Appendix 
E. 
The method of computation is as follows: 
1 .  The total outlays (TO) for  the function is calculated by adding 
up all local outlays in the state of Maryland, (Appendix F. , Tables 
F/2-4) 
22 R.W. Rafuse,JR.- L.R.Marks - C.E. Cohen : Local Government Needs and 
Performance. ACIR, Washington D.C. 1990. 
23 Fiscal Capacity and Effort of Local Governments in Maryland. Department 






2. The Total Outlays are divided by the state total of the 
workload measure (STWMf) of the particular function. This way we 
get the unit cost ( U C f )  per work load measure. (The list of 
functions and their workload measures see table F / 1 ,  the actual 
amount of workload measures can be found in Tables F/5 - F/7.) 
3 .  The unit cost is multiplied by the workload measure (WMf) of the 
particular function of Baltimore city and all the counties. This 
way we get the Representative Expenditure of the function for each 
county and for Baltimore city. (REf) (Tables F/8 - F/10) 
4 .  To compute the total Representative Expenditure the 
Representative Expenditures by functions are added together. 
Mathematically: 
Ef = WMf * (TOf/ STWMf) 
RE = REf 
The calculation for Baltimore is described in details in 
Appendix E. 
Explanations for  the workload measures 
The specific workload measures were prepared on the basis of choice 
among the parameters which correlate with the necessary level of 
the service. (See Appendix D for a list and a description of the 
workload measures.) The data chosen had to be accessible in all 
4 4  
local governments, and their content had to be normative. Also, the 
simplicity can also be an important factor, 
The content of the different functions and therefore the measures 
are relevant in Maryland. In other states, these functions may not 
include the same services, or may not be measured by the same 
parameters the best. 
F i n d i n g s  
Looking at the total amount of the Representative Expenditures of 
Baltimore which is $ 1,751,039,957 the first we can state that it 
exceeds the Representative Revenues significantly, Without 
including the intergovernmental grants, the difference is 
$ 1,332,558,697. 
With the grants the difference is reduced to 
$ 603,531,884. 
To be able to analyze why the financial capacity of Baltimore is so 
low, we have to compare the expenditures of different functions 
with the state average. This way we can tell what are the 
conditions which - in addition to the low level of revenue raising 
capacity - contribute to the big disparity in the city budget. 
Tables F/11 - F/13 show that the per capita representative 
expenditure divided by the state average per capita representative 







all of the functions. The ones where the Baltimore indices exceed 
the state average indices are the services which relate to the high 
rate of poverty in the city. These are the health and hospitals, 
social services, recreation and parks, urban development and 
housing and economic opportunity. The high expenditure for 
recreation and parks can also be explained by the fact that 
Baltimore is a center of tourism in the region. This can be the 
cause of the higher level of infrastructure needs too. In total the 
city's per capita RE is 142% of the state average. This is the 
highest index. in the whole state. If we look at the indices by 
functions we can also see, that the RE level per capita of 
Baltimore is almost always the highest except for the other public 
safety category, the other public works category, in case of the 
elementary and secondary education and community colleges. 
By looking at tables F/14 - F/16 we can also compare the actual 
outlays of the city and the representative expenditures which give 
a picture on whether Baltimore provide a decent level of services 
or tries to cut the expenditures by underbudgeting some functions. 
At the first sight we can see that Baltimore channels significant 
amounts to economic development on the expense of other functions. 
The total outlays are only a bit lower than the total 
Representative Expenditures, so needs are satisfied on the average. 
However this picture covers big differences. If we accept that the 
Representative Expenditures express the needs of a city well, and 
46 
do not consider considerable differences in input costs, Baltimore 
underfunds education, health and hospitals, highways, recreation, 
and economic opportunity. For economic development at the same 
time it spends 270% more than it "should" according to the 
Representative Expenditures. 
C o n c l u s i o n s  on B a l t i m o r e  Is f i n a n c i a l  c a p a c i t y  
In the Representative Revenue and Expenditure Analysis we found 
that Baltimore's tax capacity is the lowest, its tax effort is the 
highest in the state, and its necessary expenditures are also the 
highest. The city's relative fiscal disparity is shocking. 
Baltimore has the biggest difference in Maryland between its 
revenue capacity and expenditure needs index: 
47  




Index Expenditure Revenue 
1986-88 Need Index Index Minus 
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1 5 9  
92 
103 
7 5  
6 1  
145 
7 1  
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5 3  
- 6  
7 1. 
- 3 







Baltimore is forced to levy high taxes because that is the only way 
it can provide its current inadequate level of services. That is 
24 Source: Analysis of the Tax Capacity and Effort of Local Governments in 
Maryland. January, 1990. Maryland, Department of Fiscal Services, 
48 
why its tax effort exceeds the state average considerably. 
Neither the state nor the federal intergovernmental grants which 
aim at equalizing fiscal capacities of jurisdictions achieve their 
goals: though Baltimore's bad relative fiscal position is improved 
by the grants, they do not ease the budget pressure so that the 




Explanation of the workload measures25 
General g o v e r n m e n  t 
The Workload measure is the resident population. The general 
government function includes the costs of legislative and executive 
jobs, mainly overhead type of costs. It best correlates with the 
number of residents. 
Police 
The workload measures are the resident, visiting and working 
population, and the rate of crime. Many police services do not 
relate to the actual number of crimes (like patrolling, accident 
investigation) so it can be best measured by the number of the 
population. 
The rate of crime also influences the need for  police in a 
jurisdiction. Here it is measured by the number of violent crimes. 
Also, the workload measure adds another important factor, that is 
the age mix of the population which affects the incidence of crime 
too. This parameter is expressed by the number of arrests, because 
it can capture the higher workload for the police in counties with 
a kind of age distribution where those groups are in majority which 
*’ The Department of Fiscal Services uses slightly different workload 
measure components. However, these does not change the results considerably. 
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would more call the attention of the police. 
F i r e  p r o t e c t i o n  
More measures were considered in the case of fire protection , like 
the number of calls, or the value of losses but they were excluded 
on the basis of the lack of uniform reports in the jurisdictions. 
The total resident, visiting and employed population was chosen. 
The workload is reduced however by the activity of volunteers in 
many local governments, so the measure was adjusted to that by an 
index. In Baltimore the fire protection is totally serviced by 
career personnel. 
Correct i ons 
This function includes outlays for the operation of adult 
institutions and juvenile delinquents run by the county or 
Baltimore city. The workload measure is the crime rate. 
Other p u b l i c  s a f e t y  
The service includes technical inspections in residential units and 
also in offices and buildings with other purposes, and civil 
defense costs. The need is best measured by the R+V+E population, 
because these services depend on the number of those who "consume" 
infrastructural supply. 
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H e a l t h  and h o s p i  t a l s  
The health care services provided by counties include community 
health, environmental health and mental health. These service needs 
depend on the total number of the population and also on the number 
of people in poverty because these public services mostly serve low 
income households. 
High ways 
The deterioration, therefore the maintenance needs, of the roads 
are dependent on the number of vehicles which use them, and is also 
correlated to the damage caused by the weather which is expressed 
by the total length of the roads and bridges. The calculation takes 
into consideration that bridges are more costly to maintain 
(approximately 20 times) and the difference caused by the cars and 
by the weather (the first workload measure got a higher weight). 
S a n i t a t i o n  and w a s t e  removal  
This function provides sewage and solid waste collection and 
disposal services. The workload measure is the weighted average of 
the resident population and the population served by sewage 
treatment plants. It is assumed that the thrash collection of 
offices and the visitor industry is provided by private haulers. 
The higher weight of the second workload measure i.s justified by 
the fact, that outlays are twice as much for sewage than f o r  solid 
waste. 
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O t h e r  public works 
This category includes operating outlays for water, gas and 
electric utilities, airport and transit services, These functions 
are needed for visitors and offices too, that is why the workload 
measure is the R+V+E. 
Social services 
These services are targeted to the poorest households of the 
population, but also to the not so poor. That is why the weighted 
average include also those whose income is less than 125% of the 
poverty level. 
Elemen tary  and secondary  schools 
The workload measures assume that the costs of the elementary 
school education is lower, and also captures the costs of 
compensatory education that pupils from poor households tend to 
require. 
Communi t y col1 eges 
The workload measure is calculated by multiplying each age group’s 
statewide propensity to enroll in community colleges. 
R e c r e a t i o n  and p a r k s  
The operation and maintenance requirements are determine by the 
number of the population and the number of visitors. 




in family houses or in more dense areas. The second index therefore 
measures the density-adjusted R+V multiplied by the R+T population 
per square mile rate. 
The necessity of parks and recreation facilities is also higher in 
the poorer population. 
Libraries 
The workload is the resident population which uses the libraries. 
Natural resources 
This function incl des the Agricultural Extension Service and 
Soil Conservation Service. The need for these services 
dependent on the amount of undeveloped land. 
the 
are 
Urban development and housing 
The service comprises of urban rehabilitation and public housing 
programs. These needs are higher if the rate of the poor population 
is higher. 
Economic development 
Economic development expenditures provide help for private firms to 
expand their activities, improve their sites. In a jurisdiction 
where the purchasing power and the amount of capital to be invested 
are low businesses are more likely to require support. The need is 





















Economic opportuni ty 
This function intends to alleviate poverty by job training, public 
day care etc. for poor people. 
Debt service 
The actual practice of the local government to borrow finds may 
change over time, therefore the actual outlays may fluctuate 
considerably. Therefore the number of the residential population is 
used in the lack of any other valuable measures. 
Intergovernmental expendi tures 
The function involves contributions for local - education, college, 
health department etc. - boards. Most of the time the costs are 
reported at the relevant function. if not, it is included here. 
Mi scell aneous 
The category includes outlays for retirement and pension 
contributions, social security etc. which depends on the 






















The computation of Representative Expenditures by function for 
Baltimore city 
General qovernment 
1,Baltimore's workload measure 
- Resident population: 
2.The state of Maryland's workload 
measure is : 
- Resident population: 
3.Total operating outlays fo r  
general government on staleB level: 
4. Representative expenditure (1*(3/2)) 
Police 
l./a Baltimore's workload measure 
-R+V+E (weight: 0.333) 
-Number of reported violent crimes: 
(weight: 0 . 3 3 3 )  
-Number of expected arrests 
for  violent crimes: 
(weight: 0 . 3 3 3 )  
4,579,000 

























2./a MD'S workload measure 
-R+V+E: 
-Number of reported violent crimes: 
-Number of expected arrests 
for violent crimes: 
3. Total operating outlays: 
4. Representative expenditure (1*(3/2)): 
Fire protection 
1. Baltimore's workload measure: 
-R+V+E 
2, MD's workload measure: 
-R+V+E 
3. Total operating outlays: 












1. Baltimore's workload measure 
-Number of reported violent crimes): 
(weight: 0.5) 
-Number of expected arrests 
for violent crimes: 
(weight:0.5) 
2. MD's workload measure 
-Number of reported violent crimes: 
weight:0.5 
-Number of expected arrests 
for violent crimes: 
(weight: 0.5) 
3. Total operating outlays: 
4 .  Representative expenditure (1*(3/2)): 
Other Public Safety 
1.Baltimore's workload measure (R+V+E): 
1,213,417 
2.MD's workload measure ( R + V + E ) :  
3.Total operating outlays 
4. Representative expenditure ( 1 * ( 3 / 2 ) )  
14,763 
86 , 880 , 659 
24,056,293 
6,714,334 























1 .  Baltimore's workload measure 
- Total vehicle miles traveled on locally maintained roads and 
bridges (weight: 0 . 8 2 5 ) :  2,563,614,047 
- Lane miles of locally maintained roads and bridges (weight: 
0 .175)  : 4,578 
2.  MD's workload measure 
- Total vehicle miles traveled on locally maintained roads and 
bridges (weight: 0 . 8 2 5 ) :  6,736,694,359 
- Lane miles of locally maintained roads and bridges (weight: 
0 . 1 7 5 ) :  47 , 273 
3 ,  Total outlays: 216,738,848 
4. Representative Expenditure ( 1 * ( 3 / 2 ) ) :  71,799,078 
7.  Sanitation and waste removal 
1 .  Baltimore's workload measure 
- Resident population (weight:0.333) 753,450 
- R+V+E population served by sewage treatment 
plants (weight: 0 ,667)  100% 
2. MD's workload measure 
- Resident population (weight:0.333) 4,579,000 





















plants (weight: 0.667) 
3. Total outlays: 
4. Representative expenditure: 
Other public works 
1. Baltimore's workload measure (R+V+E): 
1 , 21 3,417 
2. MD's workload measure (R+V+E): 
3. Total operating outlays: 
4. Representative expenditure (1*(3/2)): 
Health and Hospitals 
1.  Baltimore's workload measure 
- R+V+E (weight:0.06) 
- Population under 125% of the poverty line 
(weight; 0.94) 
2. MD's workload measure 
- R+V+E (weight:0.06) 
- Population under 125% of the poverty line 
(weight; 0.94) 
3. Total operating outlays: 











298,141 , 389 






















1 .  Baltimore's workload measure 
- Population under 125% of the poverty line 
(weight; 0,667)  
- Population in poverty (weight: 0 . 3 3 3 )  
2. MD's workload measure 
- Population under 125% of the poverty line 
(weight; 0 . 6 6 7 )  
- Population in poverty (weight: 0 .333)  
3 .  Total operating outlays: 
4 .  Representative expenditure ( 1 * ( 3 / 2 ) ) :  
Elementary and secondary education 
1 .  Baltimore's workload measure 
- Elementary school age population ( 5 - 1 4 )  
(weight: 0 . 6 )  
- Secondary school age population ( 1 5 - 1 7 )  
(weight: 1 . 0 )  
67 ,178 
2. MD's workload measure 
- Elementary school age population ( 5 - 1 4 )  
(weight: 0 . 6 )  
- Secondary school age population (15 -17 )  
(weight: 1 .O) 
222,069 
176,476 
543 , 707 
404,560 
587,923,858 
251 , 023,322 
101,870 
34,820 






















- The number of children under 18 living in poverty 
(weight: 0.25) 
3, Total operating outlays: 
4. Representative expenditure (1*(3/2)): 
143,012 
2 , 803,299,349 
523 , 31 2,354 
Community colleqes 
1 .  Baltimore's workload measure 
- Expected hours in community colleges: 
2, MD's workload measure 
- Expected hours in community colleges: 
3. Total operating outlays: 





Recreation and parks 
1. Baltimore's workload measure 
- R+V population (weight:0.333): 445 , 747 
- Density-adjusted R+V population (weight: 0.333) 
- Population living in poverty (weight:0.333) 176,476 
2. MD's workload measure 
- R+V population (weight:0.333) 4,716,910 
- Density-adjusted R+V population (weight: 0.333) 
- Population living in poverty (weight:0.333) 404 , 560 
3. Total operating outlays: 186 , 896 , 047 






















1,Baltimore's workload measure 
- Resident population: 
2.MD's workload measure is : 
- Resident population: 
3.Total operating outlays 
4. Representative expenditure (1*(3/2)) 
Natural resources 
1. Baltimore's workload measure 
- Underdeveloped land 
2. MD's workload measure 
- Underdeveloped land 
3. Total operating outlays 
4. Representative expenditure (1*(3/2)) 
Urban development and housinq 
1. Baltimore's workload measure 
- Population living in poverty 
2. MD's workload measure 
- Population living in poverty 
























4. Representative expenditure (1*(3/2)) 
Economic development 
loBaltimore's workload measure 
- Resident population (weight:0,5): 
- Population living in poverty (weight:0.5) 
2.MD's workload measure is : 
- Resident population (weight:0,5): 
- Population living in poverty (weight:0.5): 
3. Total operating outlays 
4 .  Representative expenditure (1*(3/2)) 
Economic opportunity 
1. Baltimore's workload measure 
- Population living in poverty 
2. MD's workload measure 
- Population living in poverty 
3. Total operating outlays 
4. Representative expenditure (I*(3/2)) 
Debt service/ Principal 
1. Baltimore's workload measure 

































2. MD's workload measure is : 
- Resident population: 
3. Total operating outlays 
4. Representative expenditure (1*(3/2)) 
Debt service/ Interest 
1 .  Baltimore's workload measure 
- Resident population: 
2. MD's workload measure is : 
- Resident population: 
3. Total operating outlays 
4. Representative expenditure ( 1 * ( 3 / 2 ) )  
Interqovernmental payments 
1.  Baltimore's workload measure 
- Resident population: 
2. MD's workload measure is : 
- Resident population: 
33. Total operating outlays 








753 , 450 
4,579,000 
10 , 872 , 859 






















1 .  Baltimore's workload measure 
- Representative expenditures of the government fo r  a l l  other 
function 
2. MD's workload measure 
- Representative expenditures of the government for all other 
function 
3. Total operating outlays 156,468,058 
4. Representative expenditure ( 1 * ( 3 / 2 ) )  36,519,215 























Tables for the Representative Expenditure calculation 
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TABLE F / 1  










Police. A combination of three, equally weighted variables: (a) R+V+E population, (b) the 
Fire. R+V+E population adjusted for the portion of the representative level of service provided 
Cwections. A combination of two, equally weighted variables: (a) the number of violent crimes 
Other Public Safety. R+V+E population. 
Highways. A combination of two variables: (a) total vehicle miles traveled on locally maintained 
roads and bridges, and @) lane miles of locally maintained roads and bridges, weighted 0.825 and 0.175. 
Sanitation. A combination of two variables: (a) resident population, and (b) the R+V+Epop- 
dation served by local sewage treatment plants; weighted 0333 and 0.667. 
Other Public Works. R+V+E population. 
Health and Hospitals. A combination of two variables: (a) R+V+E population, and @) the 
population living in households with incomes below 125 percent of poverty; weighted 0.06 and 0.94. 
Social Sendces. A combination of two variables: (a) the population living in poverty, and 
(b) the population living in households with incomes below 125 percent of the poverty line; weighted 0.667 and 
0333. 
Elementary and Secondary Education. A combination of three variables: (a) the elementary 
(5-14) school-age population, (b) the secondary (15-17) school-age population, and (3) the number of children 
under the age of 18 living in poverty, weighted 0.6,1.0, and 0.25. 
Community Colleges. The total number of course hours expected on the basis of statewide en- 
rollment propensities by age group. 
Recreation and Parks. A combination of three, equally weighted variables: (a) R+Vpopulation, 
(b) density-adjusted R+Vpopulation, and (c) the population living in poverty. 
number of violent crimes reported, and (c) the expected number of arrests for violent crimes. 
by volunteers. 




14. U ~ P ~ @ S .  Resident population. 
15. 






21. lntergovernment Payments. Resident population. 
22. 
Natural Resources. Acres of undeveloped land used for agriculture and mining, forests, wetlands, 
Urban Development and Housing. Population living in poverty. 
Economic Development. A combination of two, equally weighted variables: (a) resident pop- 
Economic Opportunity. Population living in poverty. 
Debt Service: Principal. Resident population. 
Debt Service: Interest. Resident population. 
Miscellaneous. Representative expenditures of a county's governments for all other functions. 
ulation, and @) population living in poverty. 
Note: 
R+Vpopdation is the total number of residents of a county plus the average daily number of visitors, 
R+V+E population is R+V population plus total employment in the county. 
defined as persons who live more than 30 miles outside the county. 
Source: R.W.Rafuse- L.R.Yzrk-: TAoca7 Government Spending in MD: Needs 
and Performance. In: Technical Supplement to the Report of the MD 
Commission on State Taxes and Tax Structure. 1990. 
A 1  legany 115 ,952 ,224  
Anne Ai-undel 593 ,912 ,906  
B a l t i m o r e  C i t y  1 ,658 ,296 ,170  
B a l t i m o r e  
C a l v e r t  
C a r o l i n e  
C a r r o l l  
Ceci 1 
Char les  
Dorches ter  
F r e d e r  i ck 
G a r r e t t  










W i coni i co 
Worcester 
922 ,774 ,424  
6 3 , 9 5 6 , 3 1 8  
3 4 , 5 1 1 , 9 5 0  
1 3 7 , 0 7 7 , 8 3 9  
8 6 , 1 0 6 , 2 0 8  
130 ,512 ,413  
4 2 , 4 6 9 , 0 7 9  
179 ,166 ,604  
41 ,967 ,023  
213 ,636 ,910  
265 ,531 ,457  
25 ,770 ,250  
1 , 3 2 0 , 3 5 5 , 9 5 3  
1 , 1 3 4 , 5 5 3 , 8 9 9  
44 ,916 ,782  
7 8 , 7 3 4 , 5 2 2  
2 6 , 6 5 9 , 5 9 8  
48 ,087 ,442  
148 ,986 ,787  
9 9 , 2 7 2 , 7 8 8  
89 ,192 ,212  
4 , 7 1 2 , 2 7 8  
5 6 , 7 9 4 , 7 5 6  
130 ,953 ,921  
3 6 , 5 1 2 , 0 6 8  
3 , 8 0 0  , 755 
2 , 3 3 8 , 8 0 4  
1 0 , 7 0 3 , 8 9 0  
5 ,154 ,447  
5 , 2 6 0 , 8 8 8  
1 ,979 ,267  
8 ,964 ,947  
1 , 6 6 3 , 6 9 3  
1 2 , 0 8 0 , 4 1 8  
18 ,545 ,752  
1 , 7 9 3 , 4 3 0  
7 3 , 5 7 1 , 3 7 9  
8 6 , 7 0 3 , 6 3 6  
2 , 1 8 8 , 8 8 0  
3 , 2 8 5  , 333 
2,168,477 
1 , 907 , 996  
6 , 0 6 7 , 7 1 4  
3 , 8 4 5 , 4 0 7  
5 , 240 ,470  
2 , 9 7 0 , 4 8 7  
3 6 , 3 6 1 , 1 4 7  
1 4 2 , 8 0 1 , 4 9 8  
5 6 , 5 0 7 , 7 3 2  
2 ,376 ,686  
939 ,272  
3 , 0 7 3 , 1 8 0  
2 , 1 9 2 , 4 3 6  
6 , 0 6 1 , 3 8 6  
1 , 8 6 2 , 1 7 8  
5 , 6 6 0 , 3 3 9  
4 6 2 , 9 6 6  
8 , 7 5 6  , 813  
1 2 , 0 6 2 , 5 3 2  
720 ,257  
6 7 , 1 1 9 , 4 5 6  
58 ,275 ,857  
708 ,099  
2 , 325 ,169  
4 9 1 , 0 9 1  
1 ,695 ,232  
5 , 1 1 2 , 0 4 7  
3 , 0 2 4 , 0 3 8  
6 , 3 6 0 , 0 5  1 
2 ,396 ,939  
3 4 , 3 8 1 , 6 0 0  
7 6 , 8 2 6 , 2 8 0  
3 9 , 4 8 2 , 5 4 5  
4 7 7 , 8 1 1  
594 , 228 
1 , 7 5 4 , 6 3 6  
5 1 5 , 4 4 1  
1 , 9 5 0 , 7 2 4  
4 3 2 , 4 6 2  
3 , 1 9 6 , 1 0 9  
3 5 9 , 5 8 3  
2 , 2 2 7 , 2 0 0  
7 , 5 0 4 , 5 9 3  
406 ,558  
4 8 , 8 0 0 , 1 8 7  
2 9 , 3 8 5 , 4 1 7  
5 7 2 , 1 1 6  
544 ,172  
2 7 0 , 2 9 8  
649 ,838  
2 , 8 3 2 , 0 6 1  
3 , 0 0 7 , 1 8 8  
2 , 9 7 3 , 4 5 1  
622 ,149  
5 , 6 6 3 , 4 7 9  
2 8 , 7 6 3 , 1 6 5  
6 , 0 3 4 , 6 1 7  
1 , 6 2 2 , 2 2 5  
6 2 7 , 2 9 0  
1 , 0 6 7 , 8 2 5  
1 , 6 2 7 , 2 1 7  
1 , 8 1 0 , 9 8 9  
2 1 4 , 1 3 8  
1 ,810 ,407  
1 9 9 , 3 3 0  
2 ,427 ,063  
2 , 5 7 2 , 3 3 1  
3 9 4 , 6 5 3  
1 1 , 0 3 3 , 3 8 8  
1 3 , 6 9 1 , 0 8 9  
6 3 2 , 3 6 3  
886 ,169  
303 ,336  
5 1 4 , 8 4 0  
1 , 6 9 1 , 8 0 9  
1 , 0 5 0 , 1 2 3  
1 , 6 2 0 , 6 6 4  
1 , 4 1 7 , 3 2 4  
5 , 4 0 5 , 9 6 1  
2 8 , 9 8 0 , 6 1 8  
1 1 , 9 3 9 , 7 4 6  
7 3 3 , 6 5 8  
73 ,571  
1 , 3 6 3 , 6 6 9  
2 , 0 0 3 , 5 0 6  
7 0 3 , 1 1 3  
2 5 3 , 0 4 5  
1 ,139 ,379  
152 ,040  
1 , 6 6 7 , 8 3 8  
3 , 7  13 ,  345 
121 ,640  
14 ,587 ,234  
9 , 5 9 2  , 700  
414 ,493  
1 ,105 ,258  
246 ,035  
418,612 
1 ,060 ,460  
621 ,343  
8 9 1 , 2 5 4  
5 ,634 ,583  
25 ,730 ,405  
33 ,577 ,104  
17 ,118 ,834  
3 ,749 ,192  
1 ,965 ,471  
6 ,996 ,931  
4 , 4  18,453 
1,973,590 
4 ,922  , 6 1  1 
8 , 068 , 360  
6,367 , 8 1 4  
11,915,057 
5 , 6 6 3 , 9 3 4  
1 ,390 ,279  
34 ,564 ,015  
16 ,613 ,387  
3 ,395 ,441  
2 ,472 ,599  
1 , 6 6 6 , 3 9 4  
2 , 3 5 0 , 8 0 9  
4 ,840 ,283  
6 ,371 ,178  
4 ,972 ,124  
9 ,576 ,100  
28 ,462 ,609  
113,508,274 
50 ,818 ,835  
1 , 566  , 490 
1 ,081 ,145  
3 ,593 ,169  
3 ,065 ,476  
5 ,172 ,644  
1 ,496 ,589  
11 ,296 ,194  
1,348,749 
9,615,296 
15 ,345 ,138  
763 ,361  
88 ,586 ,524  
103 ,092 ,328  
3 ,272 ,216  
2 , 686 ,534  
1 ,678 ,671  
1,823,243 







619 ,114  
958 , 768 
1,752,858 





4 , 955 , 490 
15 ,228 ,394  
1 ,099 ,025  
102,910,539 
76 ,308 ,683  
765,941 
1,859,724 
811 ,261  
12,727,754 
19,059,656 
5 ,721 ,624  
15,661,672 
Source: I b i d .  
TABLE F / 3  
OPERATING OUTLAYS OF ALL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS I N  MARYLAND, BY FUNCTION, FY 1988 
( 1 0 )  ( 1 1 )  ( 1 2 )  ( 1 3 )  ( 1 4 )  ( 1 5 )  ( 1 6 )  
T o t a l  $298,141,389 $587,923,858 $2 ,803 ,299 ,349  $296,302,338 $186,896,047 $95,870,367 $7,843,557 
A 1  legany 
Anne Arundel  
B a l t i m o r e  C i t y  
8 a l  t imore 
C a l v e r t  
C a r o l i n e  




F r e d e r i c k  
G a r r e t t  




P r .  George’s 
Queen Anne’s 
S t .  Mary’s 
Somerset 
Ta 1 b o t  
Washington 
W i com i co 
Worcester 




3,244 , 356 
1,766,651 
5 ,991 ,534  
3 , 158 , 432 
5 , 627,846 
2,024 , 321 
6,294 , 231 
2,085 , 397 
6,015,338 




2 , 600,062 












8 , 414 , 403 
6,115,579 
8,325 , 440 
4,161,693 
6,833 , 788 






2 , 744,747 
















88 ,919 ,923  
19,533,617 

















1 ,066 ,976  
3 ,522 ,264  
5,202,150 
11,471,137 
1 , 007 , 699 
7,293,604 









7 , 335 , 002 
2,132,988 
813,127 
8x1 , a7 1 
913,707 





937 ,743  
373 , 839  
2 , 579,679 
355,605 
2,416,101 
59 , 495 
2,031,400 
3,938,387 









504  , 266 
639,276 
8,039,995 
15 ,958 ,864  
20,083,621 
635,231 
613 ,829  
2,418 , 488 
1,330,835 
683,018 
355 , 957 
1,097,398 
287,736 





325 , 884 
1 ,294 ,406  
154,232 
598,147 









255 , 593 
166 , 950 
398,874 
224 , 91  9 





250 , 328 
488 , 222 
163,054 





249 , 728 
( 1 7 )  ( 1 8 )  
$43,891,816 $72,386,384 
1 , 150,812 
258,749 
16,016,063 
206 , 066 
427,889 






636 , 596 
1,831,414 
1 ,901 , 9 1 1 
204 , a05 
9,114,156 
1,874,841 










882 , 930 
293,122 
237,821 
1 , 727 , 100 
152 , 277 
215,502 
124,222 
342 , 099 




2 , 125,22 1 
1,744,248 
985 , 860 
333,419 




622 , 744 
Source : I b i d .  
TABLE F/4  
OPERATING OUTLAYS OF ALL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, BY FUNCTION, FY ‘88 
A 1  legany 
Anne Arundel 
Baltimore C i t y  
Baltimore 
Ca 1 ver t  
Caroline 
Car ro l l  
Ceci 1 
Charles 
Oorc he ste  r 
Frede r i c k 





P r .  George’s 
Queen Anne’s 
S t .  Mary ’s  
Some r se t 
l a  1 bot 
Washington 




































5 , 630,215 
212,265 


















3 , 124,030 
1,291,872 
2,913,06 1 










292 , 980 
1,257,476 
2 , 273,746 
2 , 891 , 389 
























3,298 , 921 
1,248,569 
1,204,425 











681 , 197 
641,705 
9 , 230,294 
56,662,393 
451,848 
249 , 962 
455 , 909 




Source: I b i d , ,  
DATA USED TO CALCULATE WORKLOADS FOR ESTIMATING REPRESENTATIVE EXPENDITURES 
FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 11? MARYLAND,  D,Y CGUYTY, 7588 
T o t a l  
A 1  legany 
Anne Arundel 
B a l t i m o r e  C i t y  
B a l t i m o r e  
C a l v e r t  
C a r o l i n e  
C a r r o l l  
Ceci  1 
Char les  
Dot-ches t e  r 
F r e d e r i c k  
G a r r e t t  




P r i n c e  George’s 
Queen Anne’s 
S t .  Mary’s 
Somerset 
T a l b o t  
Washlngton 
W i corn i co 
Worcester 


































































































































( 1 8 )  
383,930 786,950 





































































































i i , i 6 0  


























Source :  I b i d .  
TABLE F/6 
DATA USED T O  CALCULATE WORKCOADS FOR ESTIMATING REPRESENTATIVE EXPENDITURES 
FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS I N  MARYLAND, BY COUNTY, 1988  
T o t a l  
A 1  legany  
Anne Arunde 1 
B n l t i m o r e  C i t y  
Ba 1 t 1 more 
C a l v e r t  
C a r o l i n e  
C a r r o l l  
Ceci 1 
Char les  
Dorches ter  
F r e d e r i c k  
G a r r e t t  




P r i n c e  George’s 
Queen Anne’s 
S t .  Mary ’ s  
Somerset 
T a l b o t  
Washington 
W i comi co 
Worces ter  
( 1 )  
4 , 5 3 6 , 0 0 0  
75 ,400  
41 1 , 0 0 0  
755 ,500  
6 8 0 , 7 0 0  
4 5 , 3 0 0  
2 4 , 7 0 0  
115 ,100  
69 ,600  
91 ,500  
3 0 , 3 0 0  
135 ,500  
2 6 , 7 0 0  
162,900 
154,700 
17 ,000  
6 8 2 , 2 0 0  
689 ,100  
30 ,800  
6 7 , 8 0 0  
19 ,400  
2 7 , 5 0 0  
116,600 
7 0 , 6 0 0  
3 6 , 3 0 0  
( 2 )  
4 , 6 2 2 , 0 0 0  
75 ,200  
417 ,600  
7 5 1 , 4 0 0  
6 8 9 , 3 0 0  
4 8 , 0 0 0  
25 ,300  
118 ,700  
71 ,800  
9 4 , 8 0 0  
30 ,400  
139 ,700  
26 ,900  
170  , 400  
163 ,000  
17,000 
704  9 0 0  
701 ,000  
32 ,000  
70 ,300  
19 ,400  
2 8 , 0 0 0  
117 ,800  
72,000 
36 ,900  
( 3 )  
4 , 5 7 9 , 0 0 0  
7 5 , 3 0 0  
4 1 4 , 3 0 0  
753 ,450  
685 ,000  
4 6 , 6 5 0  
2 5 , 0 0 0  
116,900 
70,700 
9 3 , 1 5 0  
3 0  , 350  
137 ,600  
26 ,800  
166 ,650  
158  8 5 0  
17 ,000  
693 ,550  
695 ,050  
3 1 , 4 0 0  
6 9 , 0 5 0  
19 ,400  
27,750 
117 ,200  
7 1 , 3 0 0  
36 ,600  
( 4 )  
137 ,910  
8 5 0  
2 6 , 5 0 0  
1 4 , 2 2 0  
5 , 9 2 0  
1 , 6 6 0  
320  
1 , 0 7 0  
2 , 7 7 0  
4 , 2 5 0  
700 
11 ,030  
2 , 6 0 0  
2,400 
3 ,190  
440  
10 ,660  
6 , 0 6 0  
460  
1 , 9 7 0  
470 
1 ,340  
3 , 7 4 0  
2 ,490  
32 ,720  
( 5 )  
1 , 9 9 7 , 4 2 4  
26 ,299  
150 ,998  
445 ,747  
3 0 8 , 7 6 6  
8 , 0 0 2  
7 , 0 5 4  
34 ,105  
16 ,721  
23 ,096  
11,627 
45 ,166  
8 , 6 6 5  
46 ,944  
7 1 , 0 1 3  
6 ,316  
3 7 4 ;  7 9 2  
264 ,323  
7 , 1 6 1  
19 ,927  
5 ,268  
14 ,226  
48,612 
19,144 
33 ,377  
( 6 )  ( 7 )  
4 , 7 1 6 , 9 1 0  6 , 7 1 3 , 3 3 4  
76 ,150  102 ,449  
440 ,880  59 1 , 8 7 8  
767 ,670  1 ,213 ,417  
690 ,920  999 ,686  
48,310 56 ,392  
2 5 , 3 2 0  3 2 , 3 7 4  
117 ,970  152 ,075  
97 , 400  120 ,496  
31 ,050  42,677 
148,630 193 ,796  
29 ,400  38 , 0 6 5  
169 ,050  215,994 
162 ,040  233 ,053  
17 ,440  23 ,756  
7 0 4 , 2 1 0  ! , 0?9 ,00?  
701 ,110  9 6 5 , 4 3 3  
3 1 , 8 6 0  39 ,021  
71,020 90,947 
19 ,870  25 ,138  
2 9 , 0 9 0  43 ,316  
120 ,940  169 ,552  
73,790 107,167 
69 ,320  8 8 , 4 6 4  
73 ,470  9 0 , 1 9 1  
( 8 )  
4 0 4 , 5 6 0  
9 , 5 1 2  
22 ,298  
176 ,476  
3 3 , 8 6 1  
3 ,527  
3 ,077  
4,860 
5 , 5 4 2  
6 , 4 0 1  
4,317 
4 ,097  
1 0 , 6 3 8  
4 ,240  
2 ,129  
2 4 , 8 8 2  
43 , 562 
2 , 4 1 6  
6 , 3 0 0  
2 908 
2 , 5 8 4  
11,687 
7 , 7 6 4  
4 ,035  
7 ,447  
( 9 )  
143,012 
3,049 
8 , 4 2 6  
67 ,178  
10,099 
1 ,416  
92 1 
1,517 
1 , 8 1 1  
2 ,630  
1 , 4 1 8  











3 ,854  
2,594 
1 ,296  
( 1 0 )  
543,707 
13,718 














3 4 , 1 1 1  
59,737 
3,506 
































TABLE F/?  
DATA USED TO CALCULATE WORKLOADS FOR ESTIMATING REPRESENTATIVE EXPENDITURES 
FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS I N  MARYLAND, BY COUNTY, 1988 
T o t a l  6,736,694,359 46,180 3,463,221 1,093 72.5% 37 ,411  11,917 9,844 5,614,434 774,228 393,869 380,358 
A1 l e g a n y  81,805,413 1,461 378,322 119 89 .3  163 174 427 255,479 
Anne A r u n d e l  423,134,178 3,139 123,287 39 49.0 1,496 1,132 418 195,351 
B a l t i m o r e  C i t y  2 ,563,614,047 4,486 608,802 192 100.0 14,763 1,897 80 4,315 
B a l t i m o r e  1,052,686,240 4,822 80,574 25 89.3 6 ,593  1,705 598 271,453 
C a l v e r t  13,702,538 716 5,857 2 5.4 165 121 213 130,447 
60  321  202,419 
C a r r o l l  82,212,461 1,953 26,309 8 26.1 293 300 452 265,029 
C e c i  1 21,098,310 1,183 178,883 56 34.2 306 180 360 212,977 
C h a r l e s  48,243,072 1,212 49,885 16 24.7 489 260 452 272,555 
Do r c hes  t e r 43,718,558 1,265 94,667 30 58.4 206 6 8  593 363,437 
366 663 408,143 F r e d e r i c k  102,035,122 2,614 404,022 128 34.1 706 
G a r r e t t  32,463,691 1,496 93  , 022 29 25.3 73 65 657 415,426 
H a r f o r d  133,820,030 1,912 175,844 56 32.7 725 447 448 240,149 
Howard 133,678,848 1,460 . 100,625 32 58.5 520 436 251 124,388 
K e n t  6 , 675,390 549 16,576 5 73.7 40 40 278 178,734 
Mnnt g ~ m e  r y  854,305,564 4,485 333,609 105 82.8 1,989 1,741 495 214,446 
P r i n c e  G e o r g e ’ s  713,983,844 3,916 252,134 80  90.6 6 ,909  1,982 487 230,144 
Queen Anne ’s  13,396,482 1,029 20,996 7 11.6 118 75  372 232,620 
S t .  M a r y ’ s  31,554,633 990 3 4  , 086  11 22 .0  391 198 373 214,629 
Somerse t  12,080,146 729 2,995 1 36.7 116 46 338 211,600 
Ta 1 bot 29,983,823 841  20,522 6 47.9 147 60  259 169,279 
W a s h i n g t o n  184,332,504 1 ,911  180,365 57 5 5 . 0  263 30 1 455 277,512 
W i comi co 111,819,831 1,637 58 , 200 18 44.3 6 1.4 179 379 229,959 
W o r c e s t e r  28,193,786 1,339 32,309 10  67 .0  214 85 475 293,943 
C a r o l i n e  18,155,848 1,035 191,330 60  31.9 112 
--------------------___________________L------------------------------------------------------------- 
11,544 6,029 5,516 
73,411 37,337 36,073 
126,357 66,413 59,944 
110,166 54,426 55,739 
7,744 3,959 3,785 
3,841 1,953 1,887 
19,245 9,717 9,528 
11,697 6,082 5,615 
16,795 8,877 7,917 
4,449 2,235 2,214 
23,615 12,100 11,515 
4,221 2,172 2,049 
28,835 14,735 14,100 
27,451 13,514 13,937 - 2 ,649 1 , 3 6 4  1,285 
110,359 54,090 56,269 
129,967 67,212 62,755 
4,816 2,388 2,428 
3,055 1,618 1,437 
3,912 1,924 1,988 
19,857 10,144 9,713 
11,710 5,990 5,720 
5,548 2,706 2,842 
12,986 6,883 6,103 
-T------------------------- 
Source: I b i d .  
TABLE F / 8  
A I  l e g a n y  123,046,905 
Anne A r u n d e l  613,782,468 
B a l t i m o r e  C i t y  1,751,039,957 
B a l t i m o r e  Count 1,002,733,619 
C a l v e r t  70,514,519 
C a r o l i n e  41,818,215 
C a r r o l l  158,032,124 
C e c i  1 107,218,336 
Char 1 es 149,578,276 
Do r c h e s t e  r 52,185,659 
F r e d e r i c k  203,336,019 
G a r r e t t  49,261,894 
H a r f o r d  244,311,409 
Howard  223,688,756 
K e n t  26,582,709 
Mon t gome r y 1,001,286.488 
P r i n c e  George’s 1 ,087 ,095 ,105  
Queen Anne ’s  44,101,717 
S t .  M a r y ’ s  114,704,496 
S o m e r s e t  33,114,649 
Ta 1 bot 41 ,647 ,650  
W a s h i n g t o n  181,744,404 
W 1 corn 1 co 118,546,733 
W o r c e s t e r  63,029,650 




4 ,953 ,708  





4 , 6 1  1,582 




n i 6 4 ? ,  256  
73 ,806 ,539  
3,334,329 
7,332,338 
2 ,060  , 063  


















1 ,134 ,673  
53,343,536 
70,572,558 
2,176 , 914 
5,793,908 
1 , 524,508 
2,203,574 
8 , 209,901 
6,760,964 













8 ,085 ,539  















633 ,130  744,172 




468 , 734  563,181 
2,153,897 2,557,436 
322,966 502 , 329 
2,470,347 2,850,372 
2,192,690 3,075,485 
191,863 3 13 $ 4 9 0  
8 ,654 ,903  14,239,067 
15,246,391 12,740,359 
410,515 514,935 
1 ,176 ,108  1,200,177 
301 ,641  331 ,734  
390,841 571,614 
1 ,403 ,318  2,237,490 
1,365,673 1,414,225 












2,085 , 028 
5,130,209 
















































58,294,517 1 83,423 
52,158,827 
2,108,135 
4,913 , 507 
1,358,114 




i2 ,590 ,9a8  
TABLE F/9  
REPRESENTATIVE EXPENDITURES OF ALL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN MARYLAND, BY FUNCTION, FY 1988 
Total $298,141,389 $587,923,858 $2,803,299,349 $296,302,338 $186,896,047 $95,870,367 $7,843,557 $43,891,816 $72,386,384 
A1 legany 7 , 343 , 868  
Anne Arundel 17,577,444 
Baltimore City 117,697,924 
Baltimore Count 27,292,025 
Ca 1 vert 2,660,473 
Caroline 2 , 386,182 
Carroll 4,360,197 
Ceci 1 4,416,453 
Charles 4 , 973,982 
Dorchester 3,328 , 036  






Prince George’s 33,363,471 
Queen Anne’s 1 ,911 ,121  
St. Mary’s 5,088,032 
Some r se t 2,342,678 
Ta 1 bot  2 ,156 ,062  
Washington 8 , 682,403 
Worcester 3,229,926 







7 , 473 , 765 















































7 , 365,006 
4,476,483 
6,427,525 
























1 ,084,062 635,438 
3,298,276 2,880,926 
1,026,616 561,111 






i,584,5il : ,445,698 
716,894 406,177 
800,556 581,001 
3,578,902 2 ,453 ,812  




379 , 229 
182,239 
























































2,268 , 938 
1,634,901 











REPRESENTATIVE EXPENDITURES OF MD. LOCAL GOVTS. ,  FY 1988 
Tota l  $10 , 286 , 993 $233,975,055 $290,755,979 $10,872,859 $156,468,058 
A 1  legany 241,867 
Anne Arundel 566 , 985 
Baltimore C i t y  4,487,362 
Baltimore Count 861,004 
Calver t  89  , 683 
Carol ine 78,241 
C a r r o l l  123,578 
Ceci 1 140 , 920 
Charles 162 , 762 
Oorchester 109,771 
F rede r i ck 189,359 
Garre t t  104,177 
Ha r f ord 270,499 
Howard 107,813 
Kent 54,135 
Montgomery 632 , 690 
Prince George's 1,107,677 
Queen Anne's 61,433 
S t .  Mary's 160,194 




Somerset 7 3  , 944 






5 , 973,288 
3,612 , 587 




8,515 , 384 
8 ,116 ,824  




3,528 , 276 
991,290 
1,417,953 
5 , 988,617 
3 , 643,245 
1,870,165 





1 , 587 , 442 
7,422,882 
4 , 489 , 287 
5,914,811 
1,927,155 







1 , 993,828 
4 , 384,516 




2 , 324 , 0 1  6 
178 , 800 





277 , 580 
167,878 
221 , 185 
7 2 , 066  
326 , '132 
63 , 637 
395,711 





46 , 065  
65 , 893  
278 , 292 
169 , 302 
86  , 907 
74 , 559 




1 , 470,632 
872,149 
3 , 295 , 875 
2 , 236,117 
3,119,564 
1,088,370 
4 , 240,721 
1,027 , 393 






2 , 392 , 246 





Source: I b i d .  
TABLE F/11  
INDEX OF PER CAPITA REPRESENTATIVE EXPENDITURES OF ALL LOCAL 





Total ment Police Fire tions Other pitals 



































































































































































































































Source: I b i d .  
TABLE F/12 
INDEX OF PER CAPITA REPRESENTATWE EXPENDITURES OF ALL LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS IN MARYLAND, FISCAL YEAR 1988 
~~ 
Urban Eco- Eco- Debt Service Inter- Mis- 
Natural Develop- nomic nomic gov- cel- 
Re- ment & Devel- Oppor- Prin- Inter- ern- la- 






































































































































































































































































Source: I b i d .  
TABLE F!13 
INDEX OF PER CAPITA REPRESENTATIVE EXPENDITURES OF ALL LOCAL 




I Public Works Rec- 
Elem & Comm rea- 
High- sanita- Social Secon- Col- tion& Librar- 
























































































(10) (11) (12) 
4.8% 7.8% 37.4% 
$79.22 $128.40 $612.34 
100 100 100 
9 76 10 
93 146 93 
97 62 99 
110 259 113 
100 57 85 
82 86 115 
88 143 107 
89 50 98 
87 91 107 
88 79 126 
96 165 97 
96 63 105 
97 177 117 
88 73 105 * 
100 31 99 
95 145 85 
106 41 95 
95 71 101 
85 89 92 
90 107 123 
88 177 99 
106 110 86 
99 113 94 
103 125 97 
























































































S,r urce : I b i d  . 
TARLE F/14 
ACTUAL AS PERCENTAGE OF REPRESENTATIVE EXPENDITURES OF ALL 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN MARYUND, FISCAL YEAR 1988 
Urban Eco- Eco- Debt Service Inter- Mis- 
Natural Develop- nomic nomic gov- cel- 
Re- ment & Devel- Oppor- Prin- Inter- ern- la- 















































































































0.1% 3.1% 3.9% 
$2.25 $51.10 $63.50 
100% 100% 100% 




































































































































Source: I b i d .  
TABLE F/15 
ACTUAL AS PERCENTAGE OF REPRESENTATIVE EXPENDITURES OF ALL 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN MARYUND, FISCAL YEAR 1988 
Education 
Public Works Rec- 
Elem & Comm rea- 
High- sanita- Social Sean-  Col- tion& Librar- 
ways tion Other Services dary leges Parks ies 
Scale: 
Percent 



























2.9% 6.4% 4.8% 7.8% 37.4% 3.9% 2.5% 1.3% 
$47.33 $104.13 $79.22 $128.40 $612.21 $64.71 $40.82 $20.94 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 

































































87 101 60 88 87 178 108 35 
224 56 40 65 102 59 33 56 
164 125 109 62 100 81 73 38 
305 87 30 55 102 151 6 51 
232 93 42 124 94 122 48 88 
119 108 121 135 120 105 116 118 
224 45 86 49 118 82 53 66 
131 109 177 145 126 151 , 312 119 
75 128 146 80 100 61 206 98 
286 237 36 76 123 81 176 50 
151 73 38 77 88 8 39 90 
184 133 60 67 104 0 25 38 
159 79 544 57 104 103 22 103 
75 67 208 61 97 97 57 54 
148 77 99 66 101 48 77 58 
27 1 157 328 52 125 38 32 58 
Source: I b i d .  
TABLE F/16 
ACTUAL AS PERCENTAGE OF REPRESENTATWE EXPENDIT1 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN MARYLAND, FISCAL YEAR 





Total ment Police Fire tions Other pitals 
Govern- Correc- & HOS- 
Scale: 
Percent 100.0% 6.4% 



















































































































































































































































4 .  Policy tools that treat the mismatch of revenues and 
expenditures in Baltimore 
The policy tools described in the following two chapters all 
attempt to ameliorate the problem of fiscal disparity of cities. 
In chapter four I will describe one of these tools: an 
intergovernmental grant which also aims at improving the 
competitiveness of Baltimore city by giving funds for economic 
development activities. 
In the following I describe the economic theories underlying the 
intergovernmental- grants, and I will evaluate the CDBG as a policy 
tool to address the fiscal disparity problem of the Baltimore 
region. 
4 .  7 The In tergovernmen t a l  G r a n t s  
T h e  u n d e r l y i n g  c a s e s  for i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  g r a n t s  
There are major cases in the theory of fiscal federalism to justify 
the need for  intergovernmental grants. 
Transfers from the central to the local level can be justified by 





















needs to finance public services than revenues for it. Usually the 
capacity of the national government to collect funds is bigger, 
because central governments can levy income and sales taxes more 
easily, they do not have to be afraid of the locational effect of 
these taxes. Most of the time only rich jurisdictions are capable 
to cover costs from their own funds. If the national government 
wants to set up a vertical balance among the tiers of the 
government it transfers funds for the discretionary use of the 
local level (e.g. general tax collection redistribution, or a more 
complex type of it was the general revenue sharing). 
Another major case for intergovernmental grant is to deal with 
horizontal inequalities among local or state governments. The 
urban development trends in the US highlighted this function of the 
grants in the past 25 years. Suburban local municipalities with 
wealthier population, with more valuable properties and less 
expensive public services have had a much higher fiscal capacity 
than central cities. The redistribution objectives of grants can 
take the form of formulas which take into consideration the fiscal 
capacity of local governments and the needs of the population. 26 
If the national government wants to ensure that localities spend at 
least a minimum level for a certain service (health care, 
education) because the service has externalities for the whole 
26 Income level, level of unemployment, number of homeless people, share of 














In cases of public goods and services which have spillover e f f e c t s  
(e.g. road network) municipalities would n o t  provide more services 
than from what t:heir residents can benefit. This would lead to more 
costly services, uncoordinated infrastructure systems in a country 
or the total elimination of the provision of the service. Federal 
assistance induces a level of investment which reflects the 
interests of the whole society, and would not be achieved because 
of market failure. This is accomplished with categorical grants. 
Sometimes a service can be provided more efficiently if the 
economies of scale is taken into consideration. Central governments 
can encourage local governments to provide services in cooperation. 
Intergovernmental grants in practice can not be classified under 
only one of the above mentioned objectives. Most of the time they 
have many of these characteristics. General Revenue Sharing treated 
the vertical and horizontal disequilibrium of governments, 
categorical grants deal with the problems of externalities and 
spillover effects. 
T h e  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  of g r a n t s  i n  the U S  
Federal and state grants in the US can take several forms, have 





















number of purposes. The history of the different grants and 
research on this policy tool also show that the choice among the 
different types of grants is determined to a great extent by 
political considerations. 
All of the federal grants and most of the state grants in America 
are given under certain conditions . 27 The categorical grants have 
centrally defined narrow purposes. Local municipalities have to 
submit detailed applications for the grants, the decision on 
granting the assistance usually depends on the red tape of federal 
officials (project grant), or is based on a formula. (formula based 
categorical grants). 
In case of project categorical grants there is always competition 
between potential recipients to secure grant funds. The skills of 
program professionals in wording applications and other bidding and 
trading process between the state, the local and the federal level 
is called grantsmanship, which plays an important role in receiving 
aid. Most of the cases political concerns play a major role too in 
granting aid. Federal officials try to allocate grants to as many 
jurisdictions as possible and try to balance the amount of the 
grants distributed among the different cities, regions to satisfy 
27 There is no general revenue sharing which would distribute a part of the 
revenues collected on the national level back to the state or local governments 
on the basis of population or revenue raised etc. The General Revenue sharing 
Program which allocated funds on the basis of a redistributive formula was in 
effect only between 1972--1987. However some states do have general revenue 
sharing programs. 
71 
the expectations of politicians who all want to assure funds for 
their constituency too. Therefore the decision often does not 
reflect the careful evaluation of cost and benefits of the projects 
subsidized or can not be justified on the basis of the theories of 
fiscal federalism. 
The grantsmanship aspect of the project categorical grants, and the 
competition for funds can stimulate local governments and states to 
increase their level of spending to get the aid, but it can also 
motivate them to reduce it, showing that they need it very much. 
Between 1939 and 1963 many new categorical grants were enacted in 
the US28 though the rate of increase was less than at the New 
Deal. 80% of the grants to states were for  public assistance and 
for highway construction. The federal assistance to local 
governments - which was much less than the federal assistance to 
states - concentrated on slum clearance, housing, education. 
Under President rYohnson's Great Society program ( 1  964-66) the US 
witnessed a proliferation of mainly categorical project grants 29 
which became a major policy tool. The large number of categorical 
grants expressed a new view on the role of the federal government 
in delivering public services. The ttcooperative federalism" meant 
The most significant grant was enacted by the Highway Act of 1956. The 
federal government provided 90% of the construction costs of interstate highways. 
29 In two years the US witnessed the proliferation of mainly categorical 





















that the federal government - where it w a s  possible - wanted to 
create a cooperakion among the tiers of the government and achieve 
the national goals only by financing, initiating and monitoring t h e  
programs and delivering the services directly. 
The justification of the categorical grants is the insufficient 
level of local provision because of externalities or spillover 
effectsO3' Therefore the aim of the grant is to increase the total 
local spending on a specific activity. 
President - Nixon's - Administration ( 1  968-1 9 7 4 )  tried to overcome 
the administrative problems of categorical grants. Nixon declared 
that he wanted to give more discretion to the local level, because 
as he put it, the federal government can not give a uniform 
solution for the problems of very different l~calities.~' In 1972 
the General Revenue Sharing was enacted and in 1974 the law on the 
Community Development Block Grant was passed, 
The newly enact.ed block g r a n t s  had a much broader set of 
objectives, gave bigger discretion to the recipients in the use of 
the grant, and were mainly allocated to the local level, on the 
30 Localities would not spend more money for a function than from what 
their citizens would benefit directly. E.g. none of the localities of a region 
would want to undertake poverty programs because it attracted poor people into 
the jurisdiction and therefore reduced the expenditures of the neighboring 
municipalities too. 
31 He argued that there is "no best way, no magic, universal cure-all that 
can be dispensed from hundreds or thousand of miles away." (Richard Nixon's 










basis of a legal. formula. Although these grants meant a change in 
the type of grants and also in the main types of recipients of 
grants, the number of categorical grants did not stop increasing in 
the 7 0 ' s  either. 
A very important shift took place however in the philosophies 
underlying the need for grants. The block grants were provided to 
equalize financial resources of local governments and assure a 
minimum level of public services from an average tax burden in 
jurisdictions. The quantification of the "need" has always been 
subject to political and professional debate. ForrniJla grants - to 
get a broad political support - have tended to lose their 
redistributive aim time to time and simply distribute funds to as 
many localities as possible. 
The major intentions with consolidating categorical grants into 
block grants were to ease administrative burdens of recipients at 
the application, and to target funds for a particular geographical 
or functional area. Also, General Revenue Sharing arid block grants 
were two fiscal devices by which elected officials attempted to 
enhance their own discretion and influence in contrast with program 
officials at the local as well as at the national level. While 
categorical gran,ts were mainly distributed by administrative 
officials in the different departments, the formula of the block 
grants were enacted by the Congress. At the same time, the 
categorical grant programs were most of the time implemented by 
74 
different agenchs at the local level, which were independent from 
local politicians. 
As of 1991 there were 1 4  block grants in the US which represented 
about 10% of the total grant outlays, compared to the number of 
categorical grants whose number was 543 and about 90% of the total 
outlays.32 Four block grants are devoted to health care, two for 
community development, social services and income security. The 
others include block grants for transportation, vocational 
education, training and employment. 
with categorical grants recipient governments may have to dedicate 
some of their own funds. These grants are called matching grants. 
The higher the federal matching rate is, the bigger the incentive 
is to provide the service. In case of block grants and many 
categorical grant-s too, the federal governments covers total costs, 
which are non-matching grants. Matching requirements decreased 
recently. At present half of the grants have matching requirements, 
half of them do not. 
Almost all of the grants are close-ended, which means that they 
have a maximum limit of federal funds available . 'The open-ended 
grants however reimburse recipients without any limit. 33 
32 Data from Characteristics of Federal Grant-in-Aid Programs to State and 
33 Medicaid is an example of open-ended grant in the US. 





















Maintenance of effort requirements want to ensure that local 
governments do not substitute grant funds for own source funds. 
Sometimes grant regulations prescribe that the recipient has to 
maintain the level of spending for the service in question, or that 
the jurisdiction's expenditures on the aided function should reach 
a percentage of personal income. They can also require that the tax 
collections of the locality reach a certain share of the taxable 
resources of the inhabitants. 
Maintenance of effort requirements seldom achieve their objectives. 
First of all it is very difficult to measure whether a municipality 
maintained its level of spending for a certain service, or whether 
tax revenues reached the desired level. If the regulations request 
a nominal amount. of spending for  the aided service, it can be 
eroded by inflation, or the increasing demand can be satisfied 
from the grant arid not from an own source. 
The fiscal effects of g r a n t s  on the s p e n d i n g  of r e c i p i e n t s  
Economic theories are mainly concerned with the question, whether 
which type of grants can more effectively achieve the overall goal 
of this tool: to increase the spending of local or state 
governments the most for  a certain function given the level of the 
grant. The justification underlying the use of the grant is that 
the desirable level of spending would not occur without this 
incentive because of market failure. Local governments would not 
start spending on poverty problems in their jurisdiction, because 
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anti-poverty programs attract more poor people, therefore the 
expenditures of one municipality have spill-over effects .  Another 
example is when the effective demand for some service does not 
appear on the market because people have very l o w  level of incomes 
but the provision of the service has externalities for the whole 
society. Connecting a poor neighborhood to a sewer network can be 
very important to avoid an hygienic dangers, although municipality 
may not have enough money to build out the service. In this case a 
grant can be a good solution, to assure the provision. 
Let's examine the effect of non-matching grants on the budget of 
the local governments. p r  i m k  Y- 3°C" 
I 
AB and FG: budget lines 
AF: non-matching grant 
il , i2: indifference curves 
E and E' : equilibrium 
good 
With the non-matching grant (AF) the budget line (AB) shifted to 
FG, with a new equilibrium at E'. In the original situation the 
purchase of the private goods was OC, while of the public goods OD. 
with the introduction of the non-matching grant the consumption of 
social goods is increased by DK but also the consumption of private 
goods became higher by CH. Originally, the level of private goods 
surrendered to get public goods - which is the tax paid by the 
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inhabitants - was CA, which is reduced to HA after receiving the 
grant. Therefore part of the grant leaked into increased 
consumption of private goods through a tax reduction (HA), and only 
a part of the grant is devoted to buy more public goods. 
A matching grant increases the level of social goods purchased from 
the grant compared to the non-matching grants, because it reduces 
the relative price of the social good to the private goods. There 
is still an income effect, as in the case of non-matching grants, 
which means that the tax reduction does not appear, however there 
is also a substitution effect because of the change in relative 
prices. The level of social goods purchased will be higher in the 
case of matching grants . 
If we compare the effects of the two types of grants we can see, 
that to increase the provision of the social goods with the same 
level, the local government has to pay less in the case of matching 
grants. On the figure below it is shown by the difference between 
the original and the new the budget lines. The new level of public 
goods is OP. The private good consumption in the case of the 
matching grant increased to ON, while in the case of the non- 
matching grant to OH. In the case of non-matching grants the 
government pays more for the increase of the level of 
private goods ( E M )  , than in the case of the matching 
therefore to reach the same level of total goods, 
the purchased 
grants (Ems) , 























AB: Budget line 
E,Em,En : Equilibrium 
O C ,  ON, OH: Private good 
consumption 
CD,OP: Public good 
consumption 
If the matching grant is close ended, it introduces a limit to the 
possible increase in spending . The amount of the aided good 
provided thus will be less than if the ceiling had not been there, 
In practice the recipient governments can themselves determine how 
much own funds they devote for the aided good in case of a non- 
matching grant, Therefore the influence of the grant can be nominal 
on the growth of spending on the aided good, rather it may go to 
reduce the expenditures and therefore the general tax level of the 
jurisdiction. 
According to the analysis, the government achieves its goal - to 
increase the level of local spending on public goods - most 





















4 / 2  The Communi ty Development  B l o c k  G r a n t  
The b a s i c  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of the g r a n t  
The Community Development Block Grant was enacted in 1974 ,  with the 
consolidation of 5 previous categorical grants. 'The eliminated 
grants included major project grants for urban renewal and 
infrastructure development, but the funds of the new program were 
available for most of the activities of the antecedent programs. 
In the law34 the Congress defined the main objectives of the grant 
which was to create viable urban communities, to support low and 
moderate income households and eliminate blight and slums. This can 
be achieved by funding housing renewal, public services, public 
utility improvement etc. The Act included a maintenance of effort 
provision too35, and stated that minimum 70% of the funds should 
be given for programs from which low and moderate income people 
benefit3% The Act puts emphasis on rehabilitation and housing 
34  1974  Law on Housing and Urban Development. 
35 The Act defines, that local governments can not use the CDBG to replace 
some of their own expenditures. They enforce this provision by restricting that 
CDBG can only be used for those purposes, which the municipality did not provide 
in the 12 months preceding the grant, unless the Secretary finds, that the 
"discontinuation was the result of events not in control of the local 
government." In these cases too, the maximum amount to be used for these purposes 
is 15% of the total grant. 
36 This later provision was an amendment in 1988??. The original Act did not 
include a quantified limit. The first modification was enacted in 1982 ? when the 
minimum level was defined in 50%. This was increased to 60% and later to 70%. 
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renewal activities, the assistance for  the reconstruction of owner 
occupied housing of those households, whose in,come is low or 
moderate. 
The regulations make it possible to use 
activities (like removal of buildings, 
of households, administrative costs.) 
the grant for  complementary 
clearance, moving expenses 
The Law also provides that 
funds can be used to cover the matching share of federal 




Assistance can be given to non-profit and also to for profit 
organizations if their activities are necessary or appropriate for 
t h e  programs listed under Title I. 
The CDBG entitlement grant37 is allocated on the basis of a dual 
formula. Eligible c~mrnunities~~ can chose the one which is more 
favorable for them. 
37 Communities which do not qualify for  the entitlement grant, can apply for 
a certain part of the grant, which HUD distributes under its discretion. 
38 Central cities of a metropolitan are, another city in a metropolitan 
area with more than 50.000 inhabitants, or urban communities which has more than 
200.000 inhabitants excluding the population of eligible cities. 
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Formula one is the weighted average of 
- the population of the city and the population of all the 
metropolitan areas (1990 Census, weight 0.25) 
- The extent of poverty in the city to the poverty in all 
metropolitan areas (no. of people below poverty level - 1990 
Census, weight: 0 .5 )  
- the extent of overcrowding in the city to a11 metropolitan 
areas (no. of housing units with 1.01 or more persons per room 
- 1980 census, weight: 0 . 2 5 )  
Formula two (introduced in 1 9 7 7 )  is the weighted average of the 
ratios between: 
- growth lag in the city to all metropolitan areas (lag in 
population growth- 1960 Census, and the current number of 
residents , weight: 0 . 2 ) 
- the extent of poverty in the city to the poverty in all 
metropolitan areas (no. of people below poverty level, 1990 
Census, weight 0.3)  
- the age of housing in the city and in all metropolitan areas 
(no. of year-round housing built in 1939 or earlier - 1980 
Census, weigh: 0 . 5 )  
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Major  p o l i c y  i s s u e s  c o n c e r n i n g  the CDBG d u r i n g  the p a s t  20 years of 
i t s  history 
The history of the CDBG and also the circumstances of its enactment 
can be characterized by three major debates. The first concerns the 
discussion over whether the CDBG is mainly a developmental or 
locally redistributive program, the second one is related to the 
appropriateness of federal involvement in other words the 
discretion of localities in using federal funds. The third debate 
which lead to the first amendment of the regulations, concerns the 
allocation formula, the extent of the redistribution at the federal 
level. 
The first debate includes the choice between two possible 
strategies: whether to put the emphasis on a fiscal goal, t o  
ensure that central cities become competitive with the suburban 
neighborhoods or t o  help poor neighborhoods and individuals. 
The first policy objective can be achieved by increasing the 
property values in a neighborhood, the retention of the middle 
class in a community, and gentrification. These objectives would 
neglect the problem of the poor, and try to a t t r a c t  c:apital or more 
wealthy people in the community which could give a long term fiscal 
basis for more developments in the c i t y .  Under these policies, 
localities are more likely to chose neighborhoods which are not so 
poor, the middle class population is not nominal, and the 
infrastructure is not seriously deteriorated. Funds would be 
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invested in housing preservation, mainly in the owner occupied 
sector, investments in community upgrading facilities like swimming 
pools e.g. 
At the same time the other strategy would concentrate on rental 
housing, the upgrading of substandard homes, providing public 
services etc, briefly to target funds to low and moderate income 
households. 
The 1974 Congressional debates brought the success of those who 
supported the overall revitalization of cities. The political 
standpoints were not really determined by party lines but rather by 
the geographical location of the constituencies of the members of 
the Congress. 39 
The original text of the Law did not include precise conditions on 
how much of the grant should have been spent on low and moderate 
income families, although it included it in general terms. The 
political consensus rather supported those who were for the 
developmental objectives. 
However the targeting requirements were changing over time. HUD 
39 Southern democrats did not support e.g. the redistributive ideas, 
although it was more in line with democratic philosophy, because their cities 
needed sum clearance and major infrastructure improvements. Those who favored the 
anti-poverty programs of community development were rather from the North-East 
or Middle-West, where central cities had well built infrastructure and relatively 
good housing but a high proportion of poor population.Source: Block Grants for 
Community Development. The Brookings Institutions. HUD, Washington D.C. 1977. 
8 4  
applied a 70% standard during the Carter era which restricted the 
use of the CDBG compared to the original law, although the review 
of the use of the money was not strict at all. Parallel to the cut 
in the funds the Reagan Administration reduced the limit to 50%. At 
the end of the ~ O ' S ,  the deepening problem of the central cities 
shifted the focus of community development from the development 
side to the anti-poverty part. The standard was increased to 60 
(1987) ,  and then to 70% ( 1 9 8 9 ) .  40 
The Clinton .Administration would like to clarify and relax 
regulations on business development, and - as President Carter - 
increase the proportion of development programs in the spending of 
local governments from the CDBG. Expectedly the low and moderate 
income standards will not be taken into consideration so seriously 
as at the and of the 8 0 ' s .  
The history of the CDBG and also other experience show that in the 
case of federal budget expansion, the total outlays for grants 
increase and the targeting gets stricter (Carter, Bush). In the era 
of fiscal retrenchment, the targeting gets less important, and a 
general economic development goal gets in the center of the policy 
(Clinton), while total outlays drop (Reagan). 4 1  
40 The five large cities which get 60% of the CDBG had already met this 
standard before its enactment. The small cities which were better off, had to 
change their spending patterns. 
4 1  M.T. Wrightson - T.J. Conlau: 
Targeting Aid To Poor People and Poor 
Ed. by Michael E. Bell. Vo1.7. 1988. 
Federal dollars and Congressional Sense: 
Places. In: Research in Urban Economics. 





















The other subject of big debate since the 60's was the issue of 
federal intervention. 
The enactment of the CDBG was preceded by major debates, which 
showed the fear of politicians and officials at the federal level 
that they will lose the power over the considerable amount of 
funds . 42 
Between 1974-1 977 the federal involvement in planning for  community 
development was really lower than in the era of categorical grants. 
However under different Presidents - especially under Carter and 
Clinton from the Democratic Party - the administration tried to 
extend its role. 
Carter tried to introduce the neighborhood strategy areas, targeted 
neighborhoods, where they could have concentrated funds, and 
introduced waivers on spending of public services in those 
localities where the municipality defined these neighborhoods. 
Clinton proposed the consolidated planning for  CDBG, which would 
Federalism. 
42 The main issues of the debate were as follows: 
- how will national objectives be achieved under a system of so broad 
decentralization, how will the national government be able to monitor the 
spending of funds. 
- how will the mayors be able to fight against the political pressure 





















require one "holistic" plan for the application of four housing and 
community development related programs. 43 
In the case of this program the same problems arise as in the case 
of Carter's initiative: the question of how HUD can review these 
plans. If planning requirements and the standard of performance 
were clear, the HUD field office would have a clear basis on which 
to approve or reject plans. The solution then would be a kind of 
return to the categorical grants, because planning requirements 
could not be defined by law, and - in the absence of clear 
requirements - the approval or rejection of plans would be the 
discretion of HUD officials again. 
Not only the politicians, but also the administrative staff of the 
Department of Housing and Urban development and other government 
agencies fought for bigger power. To achieve bigger oversight and 
control on the programs more and more administrative requirements, 
standards and detailed reporting regulations were introduced. The 
scope and the number of these regulations increased over time. 
The third debate concerns the allocation of the funds at the 
federal level: The introduction of the dual formula in 1977 
signaled too, that the strong political support, and therefore the 
43 The three other program are the Emergency Shelter Grant (a block grant 
to deal with hopelessness), the Home Investment Partnership (HOME, which 
stimulates low income people to buy own homes) and the block grant called Housing 





















geographical dispersion of grants versus the concentration of funds 
to a limited number of jurisdictions is a precondition for the 
existence of such a big program. The redistributive aims of the 
program were weakened by the introduction of the dual formula43 
and also by the increase of the small cities program44 in 1980 's .  
Local  p l a n n i n g  for the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of the CDBG funds 
The 1974 Act provided that the CDBG program is administered by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (Office of Community 
Planning and Development). The authority is divided between the 
regional field offices of HUD and the Headquarters, with more tasks 
at the HUD field office. 
The major steps of the program include tasks related to the 
determination of current or new policy objectives and guidelines of 
the program in the scope of the national goals declared in the 
original Act, the appropriation of the funds in the budget at the 
federal level, the application for eligible funds, implementing the 
program at the local level, the monitoring of the performance and 
the evaluation of the use of the grant. 
43 The original formula clearly favored the smaller, suburban cities in the 
south. In 1977 another formula was adopted to "correct" this mistake which 
allocated more funds; to old northern central cities. It was clear that CDBG 
needed the political support of members of the Congress who could be satisfied 
by channelling money to their jurisdiction. 
44 The small cities program allocates money to the states. Cities can apply 
for grants to their state. Small cities are better off in the US. The increase 





















Field offices are responsible for the administration of the program 
in practice. The final statement of local communities which 
includes a list of the proposed activities financed from CDBG in 
the jurisdiction is reviewed by the field office of HUD. 
Local planning for the distribution of CDBG funds can take several 
forms, depending upon whether the city in question has a strong 
mayor system or whether it is heavily influenced by the city 
council. In the first scenario, the mayor defines the objectives of 
the CDBG spending, and sets overall priorities which can define the 
use of the money to a certain extent. In these cases subrecepients 
may be determined beforehand, without competition. The other 
extreme is if the funds get distributed on the basis of an open 
application process. In this case the fund would be spread among 
the different neighborhoods, because the council members could 
influence the allocation. Programs in these jurisdictions are of 
smaller scale using a smaller amount of money. 
Most of the systems are in between the two above described extreme 
cases. In both cases however, the executive official who has an 
oversight on the implementation of the different projects and the 
relevant regulations, can have a very important effect on the 
allocation of funds by giving, or retaining information on the 
recipients' performance, and by judging them. 





















big geographical dispersion, preferring to give each neighborhood 
a little money rather than concentrating on bigger projects in a 
certain area. The reason behind this is that the smaller projects 
are less likely to cause big debates and public resistance and the 
program is more smoothly adopted. A s  someone noted, the cities want 
the funds with no restrictions but at the same time the lack of 
federal regulations leave the grant fo r  everything to everybody. 
At the same time local governments are not encouraged to spend 
their money on one project because they have to spend their fund 
quickly and fully, otherwise HUD cancels any unused portion of the 
grant. The grant is not flexible enough to deal with surpluses 
because of the fluctuations or  problems in a big program, 
According to the latest statistics (1990)  40% of the funds are 
spent on housing related activities, mostly to rehabilitation (new 
construction is prohibited under the CDBG regulation) . 21% was 
spent on public works which included street improvements, 
construction or renovation of social centers, water and sewage 
system etc. For economic development (aid to for-profit businesses) 
13% of the fund was spent. Public services are the last in the row 
with 9%. 
After the completion of the program the recipients have to submit 
a General Performance Report to the field office of HUD, which is 
















use of the grant is controlled after the project has started. The 
report has to include the detailed description of the activities, 
and whether the grantee's activities met the national objectives 
determined by the Law. 4 5  
Field off ices usually find smaller problems of non-compliance in 
the GPR-s. These can include insufficient data on cost allocation 
or on beneficiary households, and questions whether particular 
activities not described in details in the final statement are 
eligible or not. 46 The reduction and the withdrawal of the funds 
are really rare, because they involve a really difficult legal 
process. 4 7  
These planning and administrative procedures show the difficulty of 
both the federal and local governments to break down general and 
complex objectives into programs. By defining the scope of eligible 
activities, and other requirements, the federal 
45 Field offices start a thorough review process of 
a number criteria, including: 
government wants to 
the GFR on the basis of 
- whether the activities meet national objectives, that is whether the 
projects can be categorized in one of the activities highlighted by the 
law, or whether they were eligible. 
- whether it meets the benefit test (there is an overall benefittest- 
70% - and also each category has a separate benefit standard what local 
governments have to meet.) 
46 The field off ice of HUD in Baltimore complained e .  g. that the city did not 
have adequate time-keeping systems, which made it difficult to judge whether the 
administrative costs allocated to the CDBG were justifiable or not. 
47 The administration gives more possibilities to correct action. First the 
recipient is asked by the field office , but if this is not successful, a series 
of informal hearings take place in Washington, or in front of the Administrative 
Law Judge of HAD. HAD can make recommendations to reduce or withdraw the fund 





















assure the achievement of the national goals, What it does however, 
is that it checks detailed administratively defined objectives and 
standards which do not really tell whether a recipient spent the 
funds appropriately for its community or for economic development 
or just met the administrative criteria which can not measure the 
overall results. 
At the same time political reality and the administrative 
requirements of the grant restricts the possibilities of a city to 
chose that program or project which would contribute the most to 
its development. Funds can not be concentrated on a small number of 
big projects, as entitlement have to be spent fully each year, and 
has to be spread to fulfill the political expectations of council 
members. Also the low level of the entitlement grants contribute to 
a kind of short-term thinking on the spending of fu.nds. 
4 . 3  The use of the CDBG grants in Baltimore c i t y  
The planning process 
In Baltimore the planning process for the CDBG is an open 
competition. Institutions can submit proposals for  the funds, and 
the - the decision making board - decides to which 
organizations or to which proposals to grant the money. The 
48 The members of the panel are: Director of the Planning Department, 
Commissioner of Housing, Deputy Commissioner of Housing, the Planner and the 
Project Coordinator of the area in which the project is proposed, and the 





















decision is made on the basis of the following considerations: 
- whether the proposed project meets the city's overall objectives 
of community development 
- whether there are other activities going on in the area, and if 
the proposed project can fit to those projects, 
- whether other funds can be leveraged or are proposed to be 
leveraged for the project, how easily can they be leveraged and 
when these funds are available 
- how much benefit the city gets from the project. 
The measures the city uses when it evaluates benefits are: the 
increase of the tax base, the improvement of the housing 
conditions, the increase in the number of jobs. 
Funds are granted to other city departments, non-profit 
organizations, and for profit institutions too. The total amount of 
the proposed projects usually reached the 60-70 million dollars, 
while the city can only grant 18 -19 million dollars a year. 
However for refused programs the coordinators may find other 
sources. 
Council members try to influence the decision by writing letters, 
or recommending applications on the phone to the members of the 
panel group. Their effect however is not so significant as the 





















The city council is also required to held public hearings on the 
proposed activities and the possible changes in the plans. 
Communities can influence the decision through public hearings, 
although it is very unlikely that people not involved in the 
process of CDBG budgeting and regulations are able to understand 
and criticize the proposed activities in two weeks after 
notification. 
Baltimore is a city with a relatively strong mayor system. The 
mayor's strategies in community development give a strong frame for 
the use of the CDBG funds through the Community Development Plan 
and through the role of the Commissioner of Housing in the planning 
process. The Commissioner of Housing is a member of the panel which 
decides on projects and at same time is appointed by the mayor and 
has a very close relationship to him. The present Commissioner has 
very strong ideas of how to implement the community development 
objectives. 
The use of the funds 
Baltimore city was allocated 2 8 . 4  million dollars CDBG entitlement 
grant in 1994, which means a $ 6 million increase compared to 1989 
and $ 0 . 6  million increase compared to last year. (The annual 
entitlement are shown in Appendix A. Table 1 5 . )  
In 1992 the city gave money to around 100 different projects of 
bigger and smaller scale. The projects which concentrated to a 




















particular neighborhood (around 30) were of smaller scale, the 
funds ranged between 450 dollars to $ 1,480,000 for the current 
year. Most of the funds were between 150,000 and 300,000 dollars, 
which gave a total of about 5 . 2  million dollars. 
The city wide projects amounted to about 9.7 million dollars for 
about 30 projects. The amounts for  projects were higher, between 
$10,000 and $1,356,000 dollars, with more projects between 500,000 
and 900,000 dollars compared to the area projects. 
The city wide projects mainly included loan funds for 
rehabilitation, and grants for public services and economic 
development. 
The Special Project for Neighborhoods category had about I . 2 
million dollars. The amount of about 30 activities ranged between 
10,000 and 210,000 dollars. Most of the projects received about 
50,000 - 70,000 dollars. 
From the overall picture of the use of the grants some conclusions 
can be drawn. The number of the projects are enormous, the funds 
distributed are of a relatively low level. Leveraging of the CDBG 
fund with other grants and private funds are relatively high in 
Baltimore. 




















means that the money is allocated for  projects which have "only " 
a local effect. These mainly include housing rehabilitation, and 
commercial revitalization. Out of the $28 million of allocation 
about $6,6 million is used for public services. Large scale 
economic and business development projects are rarely financed from 
the CDBG (about 10% of the funds are devoted to that). 49 This is 
however a change in the strategy of Baltimore to u.se the federal 
grant. The change may be due to the stricter targeting requirements 
of the federal government, but it can be in connection with the 
slow down of the economic and business development activities in 
the city. 
In the 7 0 ' s  and 8 0 ' s  Baltimore invested huge amounts of money to 
the revitalization of the Inner Harbor. A big part of the CDBG fund 
was also devoted for this purpose. According to the three year 
Comprehensive Development Strategy ( 1 9 8 0 )  about 50 million dollars 
of CDBG funds were spent for commercial and touristic 
rehabilitation of the Inner Harbor. 
By the g o ' s ,  Baltimore's overall development strategy changed. A 
big emphasis is put on the reduction of property tax rates and the 
retention and attraction of middle class residents and high- 
49 In the 1990-1995 Development Program of Baltimore I found only two 
projects which were commercial development activities and were proposed to be 
partly financed from the CDBG. $1,400,000 was scheduled to cover the debt 
payments for the Inner Harbor East development and the future funding of the 
Center City Development Corporation. We can compare it to the 1980 Development 
Plan of the city, which devoted funds for the urban renewal of the Charles 














technology firms. At the same time the new leadership seems to try 
to balance commercial development activities and local neighborhood 
revitalization. According to their strategy the revitalization and 
continuous development of the Inner Harbor - the main focus of the 
8 0 ' s  - is not a sufficient strategy. The housing and local 
commercial rehabilitation projects serve mainly low income 
families. With this change the use of the CDBG became more 
redistributive at the local level as opposed to the 8 0 ' s  when pure 
commercial developmental objectives were in majority. 
Conclusions on the effect of the CDBG in Baltimore 
When the CDBG was enacted in 1974 it w a s  meant to be a grant for 
mainly developmental purposes. The redistributive element of the 
fund in the 70's and 8 0 ' s  was not strictly implemented. According 
to the federal requirements Baltimore used the funds to complete 
the private funds, loans and own sources to implement its 
aggressive'' business and commercial development strategy. !I 
At the end of the 8 0 ' s  the focus of the CDBG changed. The 
redistributive element of the grant became more important than 
before. The change in required benefit standards were in line with 
the change of Baltimore's development strategy. Baltimore uses more 
funds for developments and services which benefits low income 
groups directly. 
50 Preliminary Strategic Financial Plan for the City of Baltimore. 















The main question concerning the effect of the CDBG on Baltimore 
city is whether this policy tool achieved its goal or not. The 
defined objective of the CDBG in the law is to create viable urban 
communities. One characteristic of a viable urban community is its 
sound economic and financial background. Therefore the question we 
raised is whether CDBG addresses the fiscal capacity problem of the 
city or not. The ultimate objective of the grant should be to 
decrease relative fiscal disparities and increase the city's 
capacity to fund public services at an appropriate level and reduce 
the tax effort to the average state level. Therefore the basic 
question is whether CDBG contributed to the long term capacity of 
the city to reduce taxes and to be competitive with the neighboring 
jurisdictions or not. Is the CDBG well designed to do that? 
According to the evaluation of local officials the CDBG program was 
successful because it added 1 . 5  billion dollars to the city's 
property tax base. Therefore it contributed to the long term 
revenue increase of Baltimore. 
However, the $ 1 , 5  billion increase did not protect the city from 
raising the tax rates, which at present are the highest in the 
state. The extremely high tax effort of the city did not change 
during the past 20 years either, therefore Baltimore can not 
attract significant amount of capital. Financial disparities did 





















It seems that the CDBG grant did not really make a long term change 
in the life of Baltimore, which would have reversed the unfavorable 
tendencies in the city. First of all the allotment the city 
receives is not enough to finance high scale developments, 
especially not in a situation like the city is in 1 9 9 4 ,  when it can 
not even finance the same level of operating budget as last year, 
and therefore can not leverage private money to the grant. In a 
city with decreasing revenues and limited possibilities of 
leveraging funds, the grants for economic development would only 
achieve their goals if they could finance the most of the costs to 
restructure the economy, which is politically impossible, The local 
political realities also have to be taken into account. Funds, even 
if they were enough to start bigger economic development programs, 
are distributed with big geographical dispersion at the local level 
too . The allocation of the money to as many neighborhoods as 
possible is the interest of the present mayor of Baltimore too for 
example, whose constituency includes the poor black people. 
The problem of insufficient redistribution at the federal level 
partly derives fromthe political circumstances a program like CDBG 
is designed and implemented. The reason behind that is that big 
grant programs can only be passed in the legislation and maintained 
with big political support. Congressmen more likely vote for a 
program if it allocates funds to their jurisdiction too. A really 





















imagined in the case of a big grant like CDBG.51 Therefore the 
funds Baltimore gets are not sufficient to bring serious changes a 
in the declining economy of the city. 
Can it contribute to the reduction of tax rates then ? 
The CDBG as a developmental program has always been a target of 
debates at the federal level. This is because developmental 
programs are really difficult to justify. The case for federal 
intervention - the increase of fiscal capacity of a local 
government through economic development activities -- is not strong 
enough because grant funds go to richer cities as well which could 
develop their jurisdictions without federal money too. To avoid the 
"misuse of funds" 52 the spending on those developments which 
should not be financed from intergovernmental transfers, the 
legislation pushed the program towards more local redistribution. 
Local redistribution at the same time can be justified by the fact 
that the jurisdiction which devotes money to the treatment of 
poverty collects poor people from the neighboring local governments 
which do not have to spend money on that any more. The elimination 
of poverty has externalities for the whole society too. 
51 According to a study prepared by the Congressional Budget Office 
(Congressional Budget Office: "The Federal Government in a Federal System. GPO. 
1983.) block grants reduced disparities by only 2%. 
" A good example of that was when one of the southern cities spent a part 





















The redistributive and developmental aims - that is the categorical 
side and the equalizing side - of the CDBG are in contradiction 
with each other. Projects which aim at the rehabilitation of 
deteriorated housing and local retail trade will not gain a tax 
base increase which will be sufficient to reduce tax rates and 
attract more business and middle income households. It may reduce 
poverty to a certain extent which decreases the necessary 
expenditures of the city (and the neighboring counties too) but it 
does not change insufficient level of revenues. The redistributive 
part of the CDBG is justified by externalities and spillover 
effects - as categorical grants, which justifies the allocation of 
the CDBG to richer recipients too. In poorer cities however the 
developmental activities financed from CDBG - which could be 
justified by the reduction of fiscal disparities - are limited 
this way. The Congress designed a policy tool with which it wanted 
to achieve two different aims, which does not work. 
Instead of allocating money to at least two different purposes - to 
eliminate poor neighborhoods by financing mainly housing and retail 
projects and to motivate economic development - the CDBG should 
either target : 
1 .  the reduction of relative fiscal disparities and allocate funds 
in a more redistributive way at the federal level and 
not restrict the use of funds. In this case the federal government 





















purpose of the GRS would be to ease the fiscal burden of 
municipalities and would directly target tax reduction- The formula 
for allocation could take into consideration the Representative Tax 
Revenues and the Representative Expenditures of local governments. 
The GRS should not restrict use, it could go directly to the 
General Fund of the cities which could use the money as an extra 
tax revenue. Use restrictions would make it more difficult to 
collect extra taxes and would make the reduction of tax rates 
impossible. GRS however would decrease the tax rate immediately and 
attract residents and businesses more effectively. 
2 .  The federal government could allocate funds to fight poverty 
with grants fo r  housing rehabilitation, community revitalization 
and public service improvements. If the federal government wants to 
achieve that the municipalities spend more for these purposes than 
they would otherwise spend, a matching grant would be the best 
solution. As we saw it in the part on the analysis of the spending 
effects of grants, matching grants are more likely to increase the 
spending on a specific purpose than non-matching grant. The formula 
of allocation could take into consideration the Representative 
Expenditures of the cities especially for the targeted purposes, 
the Representative Revenues of the local jurisdictions and the 





















5. Alternative Policy Tools that Treat the Fiscal Disparities of 
Cities 
In chapter four I analyzed the influence of the Community 
Development Block Grant on Baltimore and found that it did not 
really improve the fiscal capacity problem of the city. I 
concluded, that with one policy tool it is impossible to achieve 
two different aims, The CDBG does not work because it is designed 
to address some aspects of poverty and at the same time it is 
devoted to decrease the fiscal disparities through economic 
development. 
In the following chapter I will describe the alternative policy 
tools which could address the problems of fiscal capacity of 
Baltimore. In addition to the brief theoretical discussion of these 
tools an example from Baltimore city is presented where possible. 
I start by describing the underlying cases for the distribution of 
tasks among the different tiers of government on the basis of the 
theory of fiscal federalism and I examine a few cases of 
reassigning tasks between Baltimore city and the state of Maryland. 
A part of the policy tools described directly concentrate on the 
spatial fiscal mismatch problem. The spatial mismatch hypotheses 





















central cities. The flow of middle class households form the 
central cities and the decentralization of workplaces is a process 
which can be a major cause for the decreasing revenues of central 
cities and at the same time, the much higher expenditures on social 
services, public safety, and health care. A recent study53 on 35 
cities shows that cities spent 1 . 5 1  $ per capita for every $1 -00 
spent by suburban governments. 
The city-suburb fiscal capacity differences can be treated by 
taxing a whole region, expanding the city boundaries to include tax 
revenues of the suburbs, creating special districts for providing 
specific services, targeting state aid and federal grants to poorer 
jurisdictions. 
The introduction of user charges - another policy tool the study 
looks at - can be a useful tool for substituting tax financing, but 
only in the case of private goods, and only if the population has 
effective demand. When goods or services have externalities the 
introduction of prices can have a negative effect on the society. 
5.7  The d i s t r i b u t i o n  of t a s k s  among the  d i f f e r e n t  tiers of  
government 
According to the theory of fiscal federalism the roles of the 
central government in a market based economy is limited to 
53 R. Bahl, J. Martinez-Vazquez and D.L. Sjoquist: Central City- Suburban 





















stabilization, allocation and redistribution, These tasks can only 
be carried out at the central level. 
Local economies are quite open economies, Therefore the case for  
economic stabilization programs at the national level is clear: 
local spending on stabilization would have an effect on a whole 
region an not only on those who financed the programs from taxes, 
These programs would not achieve their ultimate goals because part 
of the benefit would leak into other jurisdictions. At the same 
time economic'crises are usually national in scope, therefore the 
elimination of the problem can not be achieved by local policies. 
If redistributional objectives were set locally, households would 
have strong incentives to move from one locality to the other, The 
locational effect of favorable redistributional programs on the 
level of local municipalities would lead to the concentration of 
poor people on one area, which would increase the level of burden 
on that government and decrease the capability of that jurisdiction 
to assure the same level of redistribution in the future. The 
redistributional objectives are achieved more effectively, if the 
programs are set at the national level. 
The need for public allocation occurs if the free market does not 
provide a sufficient level of certain goods or services. 
However a locality is interested in producing public goods to the 





















would be underproduced in a decentralized decision making system. 
The central government would more likely provide or set incentives 
for the production of the appropriate level of the services or of 
goods . 
The role of local government in this system can be underlaid by the 
following. 
There are public services whose beneficiaries can only be found on 
the territory. of one jurisdiction, therefore it is the local 
government which is in the best position to decide what kind of 
delivery and financing mechanism it should use to provide the 
service. 
Also, local provision makes local governments more accountable nd 
responsible, because people can link the costs of the services 
(taxes) to benefits more directly, than in the case of centrally 
financed or delivered provision. 
In the case of greater decentralization of tasks municipaLLies can 
also decide themselves more freely on what to spend immediately and 
what investment or expenditures to postpone, what kind of public 
service to offer for residents. A central uniform system of public 
service provision can be inefficient, because the central 
government can not tell whether the inhabitants of a given 





















like to consume from that good. 
Decentralization also increases the freedom of localities therefore 
it can contribute to the process of democratization which is 
politically advantageous. 
In different sectors of public services a different level of 
decentralization is appropriate. In each case a trade-off should be 
found between effectiveness and the level of decentralization. 
Some current issues  o f  realigning tasks  between the d i f f e r e n t  t i e r s  
o f  the government i n  the U S  and i n  Maryland 
Major public responsibilities are distributed among the federal 
state and local governments (including special districts) in the 














5 4  Source: Comer S. Coppie: Fiscal and Program profile of  the District. 
(The Conference of the Government of the District of Columbia, June 19, 1976.) 








































Recently major changes have occurred in the US concerning the 
distribution of tasks among the three levels of governments in the 
country. The trend shows that the federal government has shifted 
more responsibilities to the state and local governments by the 
Studied made on the realignment of tasks argue that these 
All these changes were not underlaid by a comprehensive theory. 56 
55 Between 1981 and 1990 federal spending and revenues for domestic 
purposes increased 78 and 60% respectively. At the same time total state and 
local own source spending and revenues increased with about 110%. The federal 
share of the local own source revenues fell from 62% in 1962 to 54% in 1987, 
while the state shared increased from 17% to 26% and the local own share from 19% 
to 21%, over the same period. Source: Michael E. Bell: Tax-Base Sharing 
Revisited: Issues and Options. 1991 May. Institute for Policy Studies, Johns 
Hopkins University. 
56 Reference to the book Alice M. Rivlin: Reviving the American Dream: 
The Economy, the States and the Federal Government (Washington D.C., The 





















changes have major effects on the spending responsibilities of 
states - including Maryland - and cities - including Baltimore - 
and the relationship of the two of them. 
If we examine intergovernmental relations between the state and 
local level in Maryland, we can see that the picture is quite 
complex. The sharing of fiscal resources, policy making authority 
and administrative responsibility between the two tiers of 
government is different in the case of every function. In most of 
the fields of public provision both the state and local governments 
play some kind of a role. There are services where the state sets 
the policy goals and finances the service to a certain extent, but 
the delivery of the service is the responsibility of the locality 
(public health). At the same time there are many functions where 
the state government sets broad regulatory standards of operation, 
but both financing and delivery is the responsibility of the 
locality (e.g. fire and police protection). There are areas where 
the role of the local governments is minimal (like Juvenile 
Services, Agriculture). 
In the 70's important discussions started about the distribution of 
public health functions in Maryland. A major part of the public 
health services were financed by the counties and Baltimore city, 
therefore the quality of health services differed county by county 
depending upon their revenue raising abilities. Although there are 





















public health functions, because the priorities in jurisdictions 
vary, to set minimum health programs and operating standards are 
necessary, to insure that citizens receive adequate health care 
throughout the state. The Maryland Commission on the Functions of 
Governments7 recommended in the 70s that a minimum level of health 
service should be financed by the state government, and the state 
is also required to share in the capital costs for the carrying out 
of the health programs. Local governments are responsible for any 
supplemental programs, or for programs of more local nature. 
This example of realigning responsibilities between the state and 
the local level can be a good solution for reducing financial 
burdens on local municipalities. The basic principle behind the 
state assuming greater fiscal and policy setting responsibility is 
that the benefits of setting the minimum level of public health 
spills over one jurisdiction. If inhabitants of a local government 
do not receive a decent level of public service, the unfavorable 
consequence of this endangers the hygienic conditions of the whole 
state. At the same time Baltimore city - where the poverty rate is 
high, therefore the need for public health provision is bigger too 
- will gain proportionally more than those jurisdictions where 
this need is not significant. This bigger share in the funds of the 
state can also be justified by the fact, that if Baltimore deals 
with the problem of a concentrated number of poor households, the 
57 The Commission was set up in 1972 to give recommendations on the 
different public functions concerning which level of government should be 





















neighboring jurisdictions do not have to be concerned with this 
problem. 
The evaluation of the existing delegation of responsibilities among 
the different tiers of government on the national or the state 
level should focus on whether the spending responsibilities and the 
revenue raising responsibilities are in accordance with the revenue 
raising ability of that particular level of government so that they 
can fulfill the assigned tasks. In the case some tasks are taken 
over by a higher level of government, justified by cases presented 
at the beignning of this chapter, and there are important cases for 
decentralizing the delivery system to a lower level, the government 
can assure the service by financing one portion of it or by 
financing the service completely. If the decentralization is not 
justified, the direct government provision can be a solution. 
58 5.2 Tax base s h a r i n g  
Tax base sharing in the US has many interpretations. In the case of 
the general type of tax base sharing practices, the state 
government shares the income or the sales tax base with its local 
governments. It means that local governments can impose sales taxes 
on a tax base defined by the state or at their discretion 
(Arizona). In Maryland local jurisdictions can levy local income 
taxes on the same base as the state tax where the ceiling on the 
rate is determined by the state. 
58 This part is written on the basis of Michael Bell: Tax-Base Sharing 
Revisited: Issues and Options. Johns Hopkins University, Institute for Policy 





















In these cases the state exercises a vertical distribution of 
sources by letting the localities use a base which otherwise the 
state could use. The underlying case behind the introduction of a 
general state wide tax base sharing is the decentralization of 
resources and decision making. The state lets its subordinate 
governments use the fund of the tax on the shared base at their 
discretion. Usually states do not allow local governments to levy 
income or sales taxes completely freely because of the big 
locational effect of these taxes. However, in the above mentioned 
cases of tax base sharing either only the base or both the rate and 
the base are defined or limited by the state government. Big 
differences among the jurisdictions are less likely to occur 
therefore people are less likely to move to another jurisdiction. 
In some states, local governments share a tax base to provide a 
particular service. (E.g the Bay Area Rapid Transit System) The 
financing of a regional transportation service like the one in the 
Bay Area example can be justified by the benefits received 
principle. Not only those who travel by the train benefit from it, 
but also every household and business in the neighboring 
jurisdictions. Therefore it is justified to finance this system 
partly from taxes from the region, in addition to fare box 
revenues. 
The tax base sharing method can also be used to reduce horizontal 
inequities among jurisdictions in a metropolitan area. Horizontal 




















inequities exist in an area if the different local governments have 
to levy different tax rates to provide the same level of services. 
The reason for  that can be - the case of Baltimore - the low value 
of the property and other local tax base and the increased level of 
public service expenditures. This type of tax base sharing 
recognizes that to be able to develop in one jurisdiction, that is 
to increase the local property tax base - other jurisdictions of 
the metropolitan area have to contribute too. (elimination of air 
pollution, treating hopelessness and poverty, securing the 
infrastructural provision of the area.) It is not the interest 'of 
any suburban jurisdiction that the central city get seriously in 
trouble, because it would reduce the attractiveness of the suburb 
too . 
In the type of tax base sharing that was introduced in 
Minneapolis/St. Paul, each jurisdiction is required to contribute 
40% of the growth of its commercial and industrial, property tax 
base since 1971 to a common pool. The fund is allocated back to 
individual local governments based on an index which measures the 
relative differences of jurisdictions in the value of their fiscal 
capacity measured by only the equalized market value of the real 
propertys9 in the jurisdiction. 
The property tax revenue of each locality therefore composes of two 
59 The equalized market value eliminates differences deriving from 





















types of sources. The non-shared proportion multiplied by the local 
tax rate, and the shared proportion multiplied by the average tax 
rate in the metro area. As the shared proportion is increasing over 
time the tax rates of the localities get closer to each other, 
Under a Minnesota type tax base sharing Baltimore's tax base share 
from the pool would exceed its contribution considerably, because 
the per capita assessed value is much lower in the city than the 
state average?' As a result of the tax base sharing the city's 
property tax base would increase, and therefore the revenue from 
the property tax would raise as well. However, as the city's 
property tax rate is very high (twice as much as the state 
average), and at the redistribution the allocated fund is 
multiplied by a state average tax rate, the increase in revenues 
compared to the revenue without tax base sharing is (5%) much less 
than the increase in the tax base ( 1 2 % ) .  At the same time the 
revenue increase would be much higher in a few other jurisdictions 
(even 26.7%) , because their tax base, and - more importantly - also 
their tax rate is low. 
If the tax base sharing were implemented on the basis of the 
Minnesota type design in Maryland, the policy tool could be 
evaluated as a failure, because Baltimore city, the jurisdiction 
which has the worst fiscal capacity among all local governments in 
6o The per capita assessed values are the elements of the allocation formula 
of the pool. The Baltimore assessed value per capita is divided by the Maryland 
assessed value per capita. 




















the state does not get the highest amount back, therefore 
fiscal capaciky does not grow as much as would be desirable. 
its 
However the redistributive goal of the tax base sharing could be 
achieved with the inclusion of other indices in the allocation 
formula. , eg. an index of expenditure needs in the case of 
Maryland, which would increase Baltimore's share considerably. 
Tax base sharing can be a good policy tool to reduce the 
differences of the tax rates among jurisdictions in a metropolitan 
area, and can increase the competitiveness of the central cities, 
if reallocation of the shared tax pool is carefully designed. 
5 . 3  U s e r  charges  
User charges are like prices on the private market, they are 
voluntary payments, the beneficiaries can be distinguished, the 
non-payers can be excluded. In cases when externa.lities do not 
exist or are nominal, charges can be introduced to cover all costs 
of a service, and establish a direct link between the revenue and 
the expenditure side of the budget. (Utility charges) 
However a number of goods and services provided by a municipality 
have public good characteristics too, because external benefits 
occur. Most of the services financed by user charges have private 
as well as public good characteristics too, and usually only a part 
of the costs are covered by the payments of the individual 




















beneficiaries, the other part is covered from taxes.(Wser charges.) 
Many times it is the localities discretion to judge whether the 
provision of a certain service has important advantages for the 
neighborhood, therefore financing from taxes should be 
increased?' Sometimes it is also difficult to define those 
services - most of the time as a part of broader functional 
categories - which have individual beneficiaries and the fee can be 
charged for them. (False alarm for fire protection or police e.g.) 
In case of pure public goods, no one can be excluded from the 
consumption, - like environmental protection a- and the 
individual's consumption does not reduce the benefits of the 
others. These public goods are financed from general taxes, and do 
not vary according to the benefits received by the consumption of 
a good financed form the tax. The case for financing municipal 
services exclusively by taxes include provision of public goods 
where the beneficiary is the whole population. In this case 
individuals receiving profit from the service can not be 
identified. (Most part of the police, fire protection etc.) 
When local governments consider the introduction of a charge first 
they have to examine whether that service can be financed from 
fees, in other words whether it has private good characteristics 
61 User charges can take the form of reduced fees for a local 
transportation system or a local library e.g. in which case the local government 
considers the service to have external benefits, like the increase of consumers 
in a shop on the route of a transportation service, or the increase of the 





















which can be identified, and a price can be levied on them. User 
charges can be introduced only if: 
- the service does not have major external benefits, in other words 
beneficiaries are identifiable, individuals can voluntarily buy the 
service and those who can not pay can be excluded, 
- the introduction of a fee does not hinder certain groups of the 
population to get at least a minimum level of service (because only 
effective demand appears on the market), 
- there are no such kind of equity standards or redistributive 
tasks which would be hurt with the elimination of a free service, 
- administratively it is feasible to introduce a charge (to 
introduce an entrance fee to a park is not) 
- the demand has some elasticity therefore introduction of a fee - 
like a price - eliminates over consumption and helps better 
allocation of resources. 
The introduction of a benefit related charge has immediate positive 
effects in terms of equity and efficiency too. Benefits can be 






















Equity benefits include a horizontally more equitable distribution 
of burdens on the grounds of the benefits received principle. As 
opposed to tax financing, those pay for the service, who evaluate 
it most, and the service is at a high level of their preference 
scale. General tax financing makes it easier for direct 
beneficiaries of basically private goods to shift the costs of 
buying the good to the shoulder of the taxpayer. Also non-residents 
and others who benefit from a public service but do not pay taxes, 
pay the costs of the good this way. (E.9. Property tax exempt 
organizations.) 
Efficiency benefits are also considerable. With the help of prices 
effective demand signals where to extend the service, how to 
allocate resources. This way investment decisions can be more 
rational, local governments do not have to rely on public hearings 
and other methods of political lobbying. If a service is provided 
free of charge, shortage and overconsumption will occur at the same 
item, the demand always exceeds the supply. 
In case of free supply anybody - even the non-residents - can be 
subsidized independently from the level of income they have. Costs 
to the local government can be reduced, if charges are introduced 
and only low income people are subsidized. 





















decreased which reduces dead weight loss62, and 
advantageous, In times when local governments 
politically more 
are not able to 
increase revenues from taxes, they can finance public services from 
user fees. 
The user charge as opposed to progressive tax financing e.g. may 
be more regressive, If income redistribution is very important or 
the demand of low income people would not even appear as an 
effective demand then different methods of subsidizing low income 
families can be introduced. For example a minimal level of service 
can be assured to everybody free of charge, while more supply in 
terms of quality and quantity should be paid for by the individual, 
However the possibilities of a local government are not always 
clear, In the case of a poor community, the effective demand for a 
certain service would not even appear for  a public service with 
private good characteristics, but it does not mean that the 
municipality should not extend the service to that community at 
least at a minimum level free of charge. 63 
62 The loss for  the whole society which is caused when a tax 
is introduced and it diverts decisions from the ones that would be 
made under market conditions without state intervention. 
63 In the absence of a sewage system in a community, the whole society 
suffers, because the risk of disease increase. There are case when external 
benefits would be lost, if charges were introduced. Therefore at least a minimum 





















This argument however can be in conflict with the efficiency 
argument because consumers who will receive the service free of 
charge, will not be motivated to consume less. In these cases a 
trade off between equity and efficiency has to be achieved. 
Clearly the possibility of a local government to introduce charges 
and finance services this way can solve problems of insufficient 
revenues, although the possibility is limited. 
The possibilities to introduce utility and user charges in 
Baltimore 
User charges amount to an important level of revenues of 
municipalities in the US. The reliance of local governments on user 
fees has been growing since the 50's. The period 1977-1983 was 
called the fee period, when local governments had to face a 
decrease in tax revenues which highlighted the importance of fees. 
The increasing reliance on user fees stopped at the beginning of 
the ~ O ' S ,  because of the increased value of property tax 
collections and more state subsidies. 
In Baltimore, the water fees e.g were covered from the revenues of 
property taxes until 1979 ,  when an Amendment established the 
separate water and waste water company 64 which is financially 
64 The enterprise is managed by the Bureau of Water and Waster Water which 
belongs to the Department of Public Works.The Head of the Bureau is appointed by 
the Mayor, and the Board of Estimates exercises the ownership rights of the city: 






















independent from the city. 
We can evaluate the introduction of the water charge in Baltimore 
as a necessary and positive step. It not only increased the 
revenues of the city, but also had considerable benefits on the 
efficiency of the system, and on horizontal equity. The decision on 
the extension of the system could rely on effective demand signals, 
the excessive use of the free water decreased and those 
organizations,which did not pay taxes to the city !but used the 
water, paid for it too. 
In Baltimore the local government assumes that poor people does not 
have a problem with paying their bills, because the water charge is 
quite low due to the favorable supply conditions, therefore the 
city has not considered a water subsidy. However it does not mean 
that every household buys an appropriate level of the service. The 
introduction of the water fee which covers the total costs of the 
service in Baltimore has the danger, that those, whose demand does 
not appear on the market are not considered to be potential 
consumers and the lack of necessary consumption deteriorates the 
hygienic level of certain neighborhoods. 
There can be cases when utility charges could be introduced instead 
of tax financing theocratically, because the consumers are 
identifiable individuals but in the practice it would lead to 





















the market. There could be services e.g. whose consumption would be 
the interest of the society - local or national, and at least a 
minimum provision has to be assured free of charge or at reduced 
price . 
Utility and user charges can be good policy tools to reduce 
financial capacity problems of local governments only to a limited 
extent. They may mean a good solution in cities where certain 
services are mostly bought by medium or high income inhabitants and 
are provided free of charge or at low price. The substitution of 
user fees for tax financing in case of basic services in poorer 
jurisdictions - as described above - have to be consider the 
introduction of a means tested subsidy too. 
1 2 2  
6. Conclusions for Hungary 
I The intergovernmental grant system in Hungary compared to the US 
system 
In Hungary the 1990 Law on Local Government Management reassigned 
the responsibilities of the local65 and the national government . 














reduced66 , the responsibilities and the discretion of local 
governments were increased. Besides basic mandatory tasks listed in 
chapter 2 . 3  (footnote 1 2 ) ,  municipalities can undertake any other 
tasks which are not specifically assigned to the national level. 
1 .  Local own revenues are low in Hunqary 
Own source revenues of municipalities do not reach 20% of their 
total revenues in Hungary. Local taxes yield a nominal revenue67, 
most of the local governments have not even introduced property 
taxes which is the main tax source of municipalities in the US. 
65 There are about 3000 local governments in Hungary. Most of them are 
little villages. 
66 It is limited to those tasks which have an effect to more than one 
jurisdiction. 
67 The Law on local taxes centrally defines the frame in which local taxes 
can be levied by local govern,nets. These rules most of the time discourages 
local governments to introduce taxes, because thy impose obligatory tax 
exemptions for a big number of residential property owners. Municipalities often 
asses, that the revenue from the property tax would not even cover the 




















The role of the national qrants are different in Hunqary 
Municipalities in Hungary mainly rely on normative grants from the 
government, which amount to about 40% of the local budgetd8 The 
normative grants cover the operating expenses of local 
municipalities. As there are no real local tax revenues in the 
countryl municipalities heavily depend on these transfers. 
Besides normative grants local governments can apply for 
"centralized grants" for special purposes. These grants are 
allocated among a limited number of jurisdictions if they meet 
certain criteria. The grants are partly for developmental purposes 
for local governments with special burdens and partly are transfers 
to individuals to offset certain price increase. The decision is in 
the hand of the national government, however it seems that 
applicants which meet the eligibility criteria always receive 
funding . 
Jurisdictions can also compete for "addressed grants'' to fund 
ongoing capital investment projects. The allocation of the funds is 
the discretion of the ministries which usually take into 
consideration the social position of the locality, but also the 
68 The normative grants are theocratically earmarked grants for 27 specific 
purposesl but the local governments do not have to use the grants for the given 
purpose. The grant is allocated on the basis of a unit cost of the service in 
question. This unit cost is multiplied by the number of that unit in each 
municipality. The cost per unit never covers the total expenditure of that 
service so the discretion of the local governments to decide whether to spend the 
grant on a specific purpose or not remains a theory in most of the cases. The 
unit is usually a system of "workload measures" of the function, which can be 
quite complicated. 



















limited amount of money is distributed to gain the maximum new 
investment possible. 
In addition to grants, the national government distributes back 30% 
of the income tax to the locality where it was collected.( 13% of 
the total local revenues) .69 In case the per capita income tax 
does not reach a certain amount of money the government completes 
it to a maximum total level. Minor shared taxes inclu.de the 50% of 
the car weight tax, 50% of the revenues from privatization of 
companies founded by city councils, and 305 of the environmental 
protection fine. 
According to fiscal federalism principles, the normative grants and 
revenue sharing can be justified by the vertical balance between 
the two tiers of governments, and the decentralization of tasks 
from the central to the local level. As the operating budget of 
municipalities mainly depends on the normative grants, these grants 
play a different role than block grants in the US where they are 
designed to complete local sources. While in America the vertical 
distribution of funds is only a minor role the grants play, in 
Hungary those underlying theories which consider externalities and 
spillover effects or economies of scale are not well known yet. 
Block grants in the US and normative grants in Hungary can also be 
justified by the equalization of fiscal capacities among local 
69 The normative grants are financed from a tool to which the national 






















The addressed and centralized grants are like project grants in the 
US. With the help of targeted funds the Hungarian municipalities 
can eliminate poverty ghettos e.g. or reconstruct dangerous cellar 
systems etc, The addressed grants mostly serve infrastructural 
developments. These grants are competitive, and the allocation is 
the discretion of the ministry officials. The justification 
underlying these two grant types are spillover effects and 
externalities and only partly the vertical and horizontal equality. 
The government wants to ensure that a greater amount of money be 
spent on certain services (construction of a sewage system). 
However there is another important difference between the Hungarian 
and the American localities which have and effect on the possible 
role of project grants: this is, that municipalities in Hungary do 
not issue bonds and they do not take out loans either because local 
leaders and officials are not familiar with banking and the 
technical conditions of the bank system in Hungary are 
underdeveloped too, The leveraging is only possible with 
transitionally high revenues from the sales, privatization and 
leasing of ex-state-owned property. 
Therefore, the role of the categorical grants in Hungary can also 
be justified with the vertical and horizontal balance of 




















too - whether the system supports horizontal equality or not. 
3 .  Equalizinq fiscal capacity with the srant system 
The grants in Hungary which explicitly aim at helping localities 
with outstanding economic, social and fiscal pressures include a 
theoretically competitive7' grant for "localities in a 
disadvantageous situation", and a complementary normative grant for  
underdeveloped communities. The first grant is tied to very strict 
conditions (e.g that the local government can not apply for 
addressed grants) so it only helps jurisdictions in an extremely 
bad situation. The objective of the second grant is explicitly to 
ease the fiscal burden of local governments. The use of the fund is 
restricted to the basic functions of the municipalities. The amount 
of the grant is not considerable, however it tries to achieve some 
equalization of fiscal capacities. 
However the horizontal equality of local governments is not a 
crucial issue of the grant system in Hungary yet. The reason for 
that is, that as local own revenues differ only to a limited extent 
i the country, the focus is on balancing resources vertically. 
However, it is clear already, that the biggest problem with the 
transfer system is, that it is not equalizing enough. The formula 
of the normative grants take expenditure needs into consideration 
but they do not consider revenue raising abilities. The sharing of 
70 Eligible communities usually receive the grant. Therefore, in practice, 



















the income tax completes the per capita revenue to a certain amount 
though we have no information on how many percentage it represents 
of the average income tax per person in the country. If we 
consider that these grants finance basic services, and that 
transfers cover 60% of the costs in average, we can expect that in 
the near future some jurisdictions will provide high level of 
services to their inhabitants or will be reluctant to impose taxes, 
while others will not provide a minimum level of services either. 
Lessons learnt  f o r  Hungary 
1. While the decentralization of responsibilities in Hungary is a 
very positive step, the system lacks a comprehensive underlying 
theory concerning the role of the national and local governments. 
As the national government finances only a part of the different 
basic operational functions, which they justify with the serious 
budget constraints, they reduce the restrictions and requirements 
towards local governments, as in the case of budget cuts in the US. 
The result can be serious in the case of the social and housing 
assistance to individuals e.g. whose eligibility criteria are set 
locally . 
It seems that the national government passed a lot of tasks to 
municipalities which they will not be able or should not provide 
themselves, because they are too small. (Small villages should not 
and can not always provide day care e.g.) By financing each 
jurisdiction separately, the cooperation becomes necessary but more 




















The theory o f  f i s c a l  f e d e r a l i s m  helps t o  unders tand  the c a s e s  f o r  
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  of p u b l i c  services i n  a c o u n t r y .  On  the b a s i s  of 
the theory, the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of t a s k s  between the n a t i o n a l  and the 
1 oca1 governments shou ld  be re though t , 
The central government has not measured the real revenue raising 
ability of localities. There is a danger that the minimum level of 
services is not assured in underdeveloped parts of the country, 
because the normative grants and the share of the income tax does 
not cover necessary expenditures, while own sources can be very 
low. Therefore the r e v e n u e  r a i s i n g  a b i l i t y  s i m i l a r l y  to  the 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Tax C a p a c i t y  measur ing  shou ld  be i n t r o d u c e d  u r g e n t l y  
i n  Hungary . 
2 .  The system of the intergovernmental grants in Hungary is in 
transition at the moment. It is likely that local revenues will 
play a more significant role in the future. With this shift the 
scale of normative grants will be reduced. At the same time the 
g r a n t s  w i l l  have  to be d e s i g n e d  by c o n s i d e r i n g  h o r i z o n t a l  e q u i t y  
more s e r i o u s l y ,  
Horizontal equity of normative grants can equalize fiscal 
disparities among jurisdictions. The Representative Expenditure and 




















for estimating fiscal disparities on the national level, and 
introduce a well designed allocating formula. Equalization serves 
two interrelated aims: 1 .  to assure that municipalities provide a 
standard level of service for a similar tax burden 2 .  to assure 
that tax burdens (tax rates) do not differ considerably in the 
country discouraging private economic development, and further 
strengthening economic and fiscal decline of some areas. 
3 .  The targeted grant category is confusing, It includes several 
types of grants to several purposes. Most of them are like 
categorical grants in the US, with mainly developmental goals. 
However the welfare transfers are totally different from the 
developmental grants and are not coordinated at all7’ . 
Targe ted  and addressed  g r a n t s  which a r e  a l l o c a t e d  t o  a spec i f ic  
purpose  can  best a c h i e v e  their  g o a l s  i f  they a r e  i n t r o d u c e d  a s  
ma tch ing  g r a n t s .  According to the economic analysis on the effect 
of grants on the spending patterns of municipalities the matching 
grants generate the highest spending for a certain purpose. 
Matching grants too, can take into consideration the financial 
capacities of the jurisdictions. 
I n d i v i d u a l  t r a n s f e r s  can  be combined i n t o  a s o c i a l  s u b s i d y  system 
71 Transfers are introduced temporarily after a price increase of basic 
goods. (Energy costs. ) Usually they are eliminated in a few years. However there 
are not substituted by a social subsidy at the national level which would take 





















which can be b u i l t  up on the systems l o c a l  governments have 
i n t r o d u c e d  and a l l  those s p e c i a l  t r a n s f e r s  t h a t  the n a t i o n a l  
governmen t p r o v i d e s  . 
4 .  In the future, the differences among tax rates in different 
jurisdictions will play a bigger role in attracting capital and 
middle income population. If the n a t i o n a l  government wants  to  
e q u a l i z e  t a x  c a p a c i t i e s  t o  a s s u r e  an a p p r o p r i a t e  level of economic 
development  i t  can best a c h i e v e  i t  w i t h  g r a n t s  w i t h o u t  u s e  
restrictions. Direct economic development activities of local 
governments - even if they are subsidized by different grants - 
bring very uncertain results on the long run, while a good economic 
environment with lower level of tax rates can attract investments 
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